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Introduction:   
 
I set out to write a project that would have something to do with the origins of war. So I 
read sections of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian War. I checked out Clausewitz’s On War, and 
for some time left it on my bookshelf. I knew that, somehow, the project would deal with nuclear 
peace and that I would somehow offer a new critique of that theory. I read unclassified Cold War 
documents, Kissinger, and parts of Herman Kahn’s On Thermonuclear War. I was interested in the 
issue of democracy, so I spent some time reading up on Reiter and Schuessler. To understand 
democracy, one should understand its origins. I brushed up on Hobbes, Locke, and Tocqueville. I 
knew that at some point I would have to acknowledge the philosophical underpinnings of liberalism, 
so I read as much of Perpetual Peace as I could get through. I read some Arendt at some point as well.  
By the mid-point of this research process the image of my project was none the clearer. I 
returned to Clausewitz, this time with a more patient eye. I found that much of his theory of war 
could be applied to conflict of any sort, that his theory could speak to the nature of dueling interests 
more generally. While my research process has been scattered and at times tangential to the point of 
distraction, the ideas I have been concerned with have remained more or less constant. Since the 
outset of this project, I wanted to gain some deeper understanding of how the world works, what 
the United States’ place in that world is, and what the condition the United States’ place is in. I may 
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have realized too late how vast and largely unanswerable these questions are. The Senior Project is 
ultimately a rather small foray into the world of academic research. One can only accomplish so 
much in a year, and even less in sixty pages. Throughout the writing process, there have been many 
different pages that make up my project. I could rarely escape the feeling that the sum of the paper’s 
parts added up to something less than a whole. Chapters have had to be cut, ideas forgotten, and 
arguments left behind. This final product surely has its shortcomings as a result. By the time that I 
had figured out what I needed to say and prove, the time to do so was already running out. I wish 
that I had been able to perfect this draft, to include every sentence and piece of evidence necessary 
to make my argument as effectively as possible. In a perfect world, this all would have been possible. 
However, we do not live in a perfect world. To some extent, that is the point of this project. 
 
The End of History 
 
At the twilight of the Soviet Union the Western world celebrated the death of geopolitics. 
The collapse of the Soviet Union was viewed by the public as the end of the Cold War. It signaled to 
scholars that the time of the bipolar system had come to an end. So as Fukuyama proclaimed “the 
end of history,” the focus shifted away from the realist interpretation of the international system and 
toward a giddied excitement over a new era in which liberal democracy would have to fight no 
ideological rival. There was no power left to struggle against the Western order, no will to outmatch 
or limit the West’s own.  
Western scholars failed to remember a Clausewitzian principle - an enemy defeated is not an 
enemy destroyed. What followed the Soviet collapse was an era in which strategy was subordinated 
to ideology. With no one to legitimately contest the United States’ power, it was easy to fall under 
the illusion that there would never be a true balance of power struggle again. The West made the 
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mistake of believing that the supremacy of its ideology accounted for its victory over the Soviet 
Union. 
Since this belief was held to be true, it dictated the United States’ actions throughout the late 
1990’s and early 2000’s. This can be seen most clearly with the expansion of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), a security alliance that came into existence for the purpose of 
counterbalancing against the Soviet Union. Although Russian Federation leaders and officials 
routinely expressed their fears over NATO expansion - not to mention that the leaders of 
prospective member states explicitly listed security as their primary motivation for joining NATO - 
the West pushed forward with the liberal democratic project. The most obvious issue with the 
expansion was the dissonance between what the West claimed NATO had evolved into and what 
the organization was still perceived to be. While the revised NATO doctrine put forth the idea that 
NATO would exist as a community of like-minded member states, it was founded by the Western 
bloc in opposition to the Eastern bloc. It began as a military alliance and while its members revised 
its mission after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russian officials did not forget its origin. There 
was also the issue that by never truly considering the prospect of allowing Russia full member status, 
the expansion carried with it the implicit notion that the organization, as an alliance, community, or 
whatever else, remained defined by the exclusion of Russia. NATO expansion was an ideological 
mission and its advocates looked over the security concerns of both those in favor of and in 
opposition to the project. 
The West’s liberal ideology expanded, but with it came an expansion of U.S. backed security 
assurances. This would pose no problem in a post-historical world. 
 
The Return of Geopolitics 
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At the 2015 annual McGinley lecture hosted by the Heritage foundation, General James 
Mattis delivered a speech that described the nature and origins of the current world order. Mattis 
detailed his concerns over the rising threats to said order. About twenty-five minutes into his 
speech, Mattis summed up the United States’ current dilemma with revanchist Russia. “Putin goes to 
bed at night knowing that he can break all the rules, and the West will try to follow the rules,” he 
said.1 The answer to this problem is not for the West to begin to break the rules. Mattis has extolled 
the value of alliance making and the importance of NATO. During his senate confirmation hearing 
for the position of Secretary of Defense, Mattis stated, “if we did not have NATO today, we would 
need to create it.”2 The liberal world order is in large part advanced and protected by the West’s 
alliances. Those alliances in turn prop up the ideals of the United States, the order’s hegemon. Until 
the end of the Cold War the West’s alliances were safeguards for security. Following the collapse of 
the Soviet Union the alliances were intended to advance the liberal democratic project and keep the 
West united in its goals. However, with recent Russian behavior the alliance system may need to be 
one of security once again, and Mattis is absolutely correct that the United States must protect its 
interests and its allies.  
Mattis said that the Russians are “now trapped, looking at NATO as a threat and they do not 
see having democratic nations on their borders as a good thing. They want security through 
instability…Putin goes to bed at night knowing that he can break all the rules, and the West will try 
to follow the rules. That is a very dangerous dichotomy in the way the world is being run.”3 The 
West will try to follow ‘the rules,’ as Mattis states, because the rules are in the West’s interests. This, 
of course, is why one side of this conflict is status quo while the other is revisionist.  
                                                
1 Mattis, James. McGinley Lecture, The Heritage Foundation, 2015. 
2 United States Senate, Senate Confirmation Hearing of General James Mattis, 1/12/17 
3 Mattis, 2015 McGinley Lecture, The Heritage Foundation 
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The Russian threat is oft overblown, and increasingly so. Putin is far off from having actually 
advanced upon any NATO state, there has yet to be any sort of extended deterrence failure. What 
he has achieved, though, is impressive and threatening given Russia’s plethora of domestic 
problems. Putin has been able to, over the past decade or so, project his state’s power beyond its 
borders to the chagrin of the United States. With Georgia in 2008, Crimea in 2014, and Russia’s role 
in Syria’s civil war, Putin has repeatedly interfered with states’ sovereignty and with the United 
States’ narrative of the international system’s stability. The sum gain of his efforts is paranoia and 
fear. Although it has yet to be seen if this fear is warranted or not, Russia’s revisionist behavior has 
led to the Baltic States, Poland, and others questioning their security more than they have since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. The U.S. and NATO have had to seriously consider the strategic 
implications of NATO enlargement. This has included a great deal of writing and speech-making, as 





The goal of this project is to add some perspective on how we got from point A to point B. 
Why has geopolitics returned? The simplest answer to this question is that it never really left. It was 
simply stifled. In this paper I argue that the distribution of capabilities in a unipolar system allow for 
the suppression of strategy and security and for the promotion of ideological foreign policy. 
“Unipolar systems possess only one great power, which enjoys a preponderance of power and faces 
no competition.”4 In the 1990’s, the United States became a unipolar power and suddenly enjoyed a 
                                                
4 Monteiro, Nuno. Unrest Assured, 13 
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lack of competition and a total dominance of power. The question of this paper is a question of the 
meaning of power, or rather a question over how power is assessed and then acted upon.  
I begin the project by defining what unipolarity is, and explaining how both realist and liberal 
scholars interpreted the Soviet collapse. I then turn to the work of Stephen G. Brooks and William 
C. Wohlforth and prominent realist scholars to illustrate the central themes and arguments 
surrounding unipolarity’s durability. 
After providing this theoretical background I critique each side of the argument and propose 
my own theory of unipolarity. My contention is that the system is neither as durable as Brooks and 
Wohlforth claim nor as susceptible to counterbalancing as the realists suggest. Instead, the unipole’s 
preponderance of power allows for a disregard of strategy that leads to overexpansion. Without the 
threat of hostilities from rival great powers, the unipole can pursue a foreign policy without taking 
said rivals’ concerns into consideration. This leads to an entanglement of vital and non-vital 
interests, which in turn becomes problematic when the unipolar power is confronted with the choice 
of whether to defend these non-vital interests or not. I then turn to the arguments for and against 
NATO expansion to provide some evidence of my theory and to demonstrate how, as I wrote 
above, we got from point A to point B. I conclude the paper with my thoughts on international 
relations theory in general and question scholars’ desire to predict outcomes of the international 
system in the short and long-term.  
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Chapter One:   
The Unipolarity Debate 
 
When the Soviet Union fell, there was some questioning over whether the United States was 
a unipolar power or not. Eventually, Wohlforth would answer this question with an elegantly brief 
equation; “two states measured up in 1990. One is gone. No new pole has appeared: 2 - 1 = 1.”5 The 
absence of a balancing rival to the United States marked the shift from a bipolar world to a unipolar 
one. The debate then turned to the question of how long unipolarity would last for. 
 A little more than a decade before the fall of the Soviet Union, Kenneth Waltz claimed that 
the smallest possible number of poles in the international system was two.6 The course of history 
proved him wrong. Following the emergence of the United States as the hegemon of the 
international system, scholars began to question how long the system could survive for. Realists 
argued that other powers would soon counterbalance against the U.S. and restore either bi- or 
multipolarity. For some time, this perspective dominated. Unipolarity was referred to as a 
“moment.”7 Krauthammer discussed the various ways in which the moment could end: economic 
downturn, isolationism, etc. Although Krauthammer rejected the idea of a quick return to 
multipolarity8 he fell in line with the conventional wisdom that, at some point, other states would 
reject the United States’ hegemony and the moment would end. It was against this background that 
Brooks and Wohlforth proposed their theory of unipolar stability. In this chapter I will outline the 
                                                
5 Wohlforth, William C. Stability of a Unipolar World, 10 
6 Waltz, Kenneth. Theory of International Politics, 136 
7 Krauthammer, Charles. The Unipolar Moment, 25 
8 Ibid., 24 
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two most relevant perspectives of said dispute, namely those of Brooks and Wohlforth and those of 
prominent realist scholars. I will begin by defining unipolarity. Following this I will detail the realist 
thinking regarding liberal theory and then summarize the argument between Brooks and Wohlforth 
and the realists regarding unipolar durability. 
 
What is Unipolarity?  
 
 “To date, scholars do not have a theory of how unipolar systems operate.”9 Monteiro 
suggests that there are three fundamental aspects of a unipolar system: “unipolarity is an interstate 
system…unipolarity is anarchical…unipolar systems possess only one great power, which enjoys a 
preponderance of power and faces no competition.”10 Unipolarity remains anarchical since states 
remain autonomous. The lack of total external control of the unipole limits its power. However, the 
unipole faces no competitor in regard to hegemony. While the unipolar power may be incapable of 
projecting its power in totality over the other states in the international system, it is uncontested. 
In its most basic sense, unipolarity is the total dominance of a single power in the 
international system, without said power dissolving into global empire. A unipolar power can be 
contested and its aims can be denied. The unipolar power cannot exercise its outward ambition 
without fail, but it cannot be subordinated to the power of another state. This differs from 
bipolarity, in which the global system is balanced between two states. Instead, the unipolar power 
has sole authority in the international system. Unipolarity is in some sense similar to the conclusion 
of offensive realism, when a state achieves the greatest level of security possible by becoming the 
system’s hegemon. 
 
                                                
9 Monteiro, Unrest Assured, 11 
10 Ibid.,13 
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Realists Respond to Unipolarity 
 
 In the wake of the end of the Cold War, the validity of realist thought was questioned. 
Fukuyama and others argued that the war was a contest of ideas, and those of the Soviet’s had been 
proven faulty. The end of history had come; liberal democracy would inevitably wash over the 
world. This was the great benefit of unipolarity; the era of ideological competition had come to an 
end, as had the era of geopolitics. For realists, whose theory relies on the belief that states are 
ultimately distrusting and security-seeking due to the anarchical nature of the international system, 
the prospect of great power competition coming to an end represented a threat to their entire 
theory. Because of this, realist scholars defended their own theories and critiqued those of liberals. 
Mearsheimer reduces the central tenets of liberalism to “three core beliefs…first, liberals consider 
states to be the main actors in international politics. Second, they emphasize that the internal 
characteristics of states vary considerably…liberal theorists often believe that some international 
arrangements (e.g., democracy) are inherently preferable to others…Third, liberals believe that 
calculations about power matter little for explaining the behavior of good states.”11  
These tenets influence another belief that liberal theorists often share; economic 
interdependence creates peace. “The creation and maintenance of a liberal economic order” is what 
promotes stability in the international system.”12 To defend their existence, realists focused their 
critiques on two of the most important liberal prepositions: the democratic peace theory and the role 
of international institutions. 
Democratic peace theory is the idea that democracies do not go to war with one another.13 
“The explanation given generally runs this way: Democracies of the right kind (i.e., liberal ones) are 
                                                
11 Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 15-16 
12 Ibid., 16 
13 Russett, Bruce. Grasping the Democratic Peace, 4 
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peaceful in relation to one another.”14 Part of the optimism surrounding democratic peace theory 
comes from the hope that the spread of democracy will end hostilities between states that subscribe 
to different ideologies. This is the benefit of homogeneity, not democracy. Another part of the 
optimism comes from the empirical reality that “in the modern international system, democracies 
have almost never fought each other.”15 This phenomenon is often attributed to the fact that 
democracies “have other means of resolving conflicts between them and therefore do not need to 
fight each other.”16 The democratic peace theory extends beyond the argument that states of similar 
types do not engage in direct conflict with each other and instead suggests that the nature of 
democracy prevents democratic states from going to war with one another. The logical conclusion 
of the democratic peace theory is thus; “the more democracies there are in the world, the fewer 
potential adversaries we and other democracies will have and the wider the zone of peace.”17 The 
spread of democracy is then equated with the spread of peace. 
 In response to this, Waltz writes “democracies may live at peace with democracies, but even 
if all states became democratic, the structure of international politics would remain anarchic.”18 The 
realist counterargument to the democratic peace theory is a rejection of the role of states’ characters. 
Since the character of a state is temporary and internal, it has little effect on the structure of the state 
system. So long as the system remains anarchical, the same rules will apply and the same doubts 
states always have will still be present. Fukuyama claims that it is “perfectly possible to imagine 
anarchic state systems that are nonetheless peaceful,” so long as the states in said system resemble 
Hegel’s slave rather than Hobbes’ first man. 19 Fukuyama suggests that the competition of the state 
system realists describe has more to do with an assumption that states seek something more than 
                                                
14 Waltz, Kenneth. Structural Realism After the Cold War, 6-7 
15 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 4 
16 Ibid., 4 
17 Ibid., 4 
18 Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War, 10 
19 Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man, 255 
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security. What he fails to recognize is that a) security can be comprised of many things and b) when 
a state can never be sure of other states’ motives, a security-seeking state can act in seemingly 
aggressive ways.20 
This is Waltz’s point; “in the absence of an external authority, a state cannot be sure that 
today’s friend will not be tomorrow’s enemy.”21 In essence, the realist counterargument to the 
democratic peace theory is that a state’s system of government does not affect the state structure. 
Russett’s point that democracies “have other means of resolving conflicts”22 accepts that conflicts 
do arise between democracies. The realist argument holds that there cannot be a guarantee that 
conflict will end altogether, even in a totally democratic world. There is always the possibility of 
democratic backsliding or regime failure. Waltz notes that “‘wayward’ democracies are especially 
tempting objects of intervention by other democracies that wish to save them.”23 While these types 
of intervention may not be as black and white as direct conflict, their existence muddles the concept 
of democratic peace.  
 Realists also critiqued the liberal contention that “international institutions enhance the 
prospects for cooperation among states and thus significantly reduce the likelihood of war.”24 
Ikenberry writes that “Western order has what might be called ‘constitutional characteristics’ - a 
structure of institutions and open polities that constrain power and facilitate ‘voice opportunities,’ 
thereby mitigating the implications of power asymmetries and reducing the opportunities of the 
leading state to exit or dominate.”25 Liberals argue that institutions, not power dynamics, are to 
thank for the postwar peace in the West. Realists counter, “the institutionalist interpretation misses 
                                                
20 Such is the case with the security dilemma. See Van Evera, Stephen. Causes of War, p. 193. 
21 Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War, 10 
22 Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace, 4 
23 Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War, 9 
24 Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, 17 
25 Ikenberry, John G. Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar Order, 77 
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the point.”26 Institutions survive so long as they serve a purpose; their continued survival shows only 
that they remain useful tools for member states pursuing of security and power.  
Taking the case of NATO, Waltz writes that “the ability of the United States to extend the 
life of a moribund institution nicely illustrates how international institutions are created and 
maintained by stronger states to serve their perceived or misperceived interests.”27 So long as an 
institution serves the interests of powerful states it will remain. Realists respond to the liberal 
institutionalist argument by pivoting the issue away from the outcomes of institutions and toward 
their creation. Waltz writes, “a state that is stronger than any other can decide for itself whether to 
conform its policies to structural pressures and whether to avail itself of the opportunities that 
structural change offers, with little fear of adverse [e]ffects in the short run.”28 
 Realists made these arguments in response to the emergence of the unipolar system because 
liberals argued that the unipolar system was synonymous with the end of geopolitical conflict 
between great powers. Realists attempted to disprove liberal theories and prove that the unipolar 
moment was just that - a moment. As time went on, realists seemed to lose the argument over the 
meaning of the Soviet collapse. Realists asserted that eventually, through either hard or soft 
balancing - or as Layne suggests, “leash-slipping”29 - the United States’ time as an uncontested 
hegemon would come to an end. Eventually Brooks and Wohlforth argued otherwise. 
 
The Unipolar Durability Argument 
 
 Waltz and other realists argued that other powers would emerge to balance against the 
United States, thus reestablishing equilibrium to the balance of power. The realist argument counted 
                                                
26 Waltz, Structural Realism After the Cold War, 20 
27 Ibid., 20 
28 Ibid., 24 
29  See Layne, Christopher. The Unipolar Illusion Revisited 
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on unipolarity having a finite lifespan. Wohlforth, in The Stability of a Unipolar World, argued that the 
unipolar system was durable. In this section, I will outline Wohlforth’s stability argument. I will then 
detail Brooks and Wohlforth’s counterarguments against balance of power and balance of threat 
theories. Realists relied heavily on these theories to explain why the unipolar system would end 
shortly. I will conclude the chapter with some realist perspectives on unipolarity as a system. 
 Wohlforth writes, “none of the major powers is balancing; most have scaled back military 
expenditures faster than the United States has…any effort to compete directly with the United 
States is futile, so no one tries.”30 Wohlforth’s argument is based in power dynamics; the total 
advantage of power the United States enjoys, he suggests, prevents hard balancing. For realists such 
as Waltz balance of power it suggests that when there is an imbalance of power in the international 
system, other states will rise to correct it. Wohlforth writes, “balance-of-power theory has been at 
the center of the debate, but absent so far is a clear distinction between peacefulness and 
durability…Less often noted is the fact that as long as the system remains unipolar, balance-of-
power theory predicts peace.”31 Wohlforth argues that in a unipolar world, the balance of power 
would promote peace since capabilities are concentrated. Following balance of power theory the 
chance for uncertainty is reduced in a unipolar world and thus the chance for conflict is as well. 
Thus, the main distinction between Wohlforth and the realists is not that one party believes 
unipolarity causes conflict, but that one party sees the system’s end in sight and the other does not; 
“it is not unipolarity’s peacefulness but its durability that is in dispute.”32  
Much of Wohlforth’s durability argument centers on his assertion that counterbalancing 
against a unipolar power is difficult. Indeed, he defines the unipolar system as “one in which a 
                                                
30 Wohlforth, Stability of a Unipolar World, 18 
31 Ibid., 24 
32 Ibid., 24 
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counterbalance is impossible.”33 To outmatch the United States’ military infrastructure and thus pose 
a legitimate challenge to its raw power advantage, a state would have to mobilize its economy with 
that explicit goal in mind. To most states, such a task would inevitably undermine other state 
interests. Wohlforth notes that “the only other economy big and rich enough to generate military 
capabilities on the American scale is that of the European Union, whose 27 member states have a 
combined GDP larger than that of the United States.”34 He goes on, “to realize that potential, 
however, Brussels would have to wield Europe’s aggregate economic output with the same strategic 
purpose as the United States, a unitary state.”35 Since the EU functions as a collection of states and 
not as a unified actor, Wohlforth disregards the possibility of such a mobilization occurring. 
Wohlforth also notes that, during the process of counterbalancing, “states are tempted to 
free ride, pass the buck, or bandwagon in search of favors from the aspiring hegemon.”36 That is, it 
is often easiest and safest to align with the hegemon rather than go against it. If the international 
system were one in which the United States was an aspiring hegemon, balancing may be easier. Since 
the United States emerged from the ashes of the bipolar world order as a sole pole, there was never 
a time when it was an aspiring hegemon. Over time, the distribution of power will shift, “but,” he 
writes, “there is no evidence that this has occurred in the 1990’s.”37 Until the distribution of power 
shifts the United States’ unipolarity will continue, since no other power can successfully balance 
against it. He writes, “For many decades, no state is likely to be in a position to take on the United 
States in any of the underlying elements of power.”38 As an offshore power separated by two oceans 
                                                
33 Ibid., 29 
34 Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth, World Out of Balance, 31 
35 Ibid., 31 
36 Wohlforth, Stability of the Unipolar World, 29 
37 Ibid., 36 
38 He lists the “components of power as such: “economic, military, technological, and geopolitical.” See 
Wohlforth, Stability of a Unipolar World, 7 
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from all other great powers or potential balancing states, the United States can retain its advantages 
without risking a counterbalance.”3940  
Wohlforth’s argument of unipolar stability can be distilled to three points; the United States 
is a unipolar power; unipolarity is peaceful; unipolarity is durable. The first of these points must be 
taken as a given. The third point, as has been discussed, is intimately connected to the first. The 
United States is a unipolar power because it is vastly more powerful than any other state or alliance 
of states. For this to change, the power dynamics of the unipolar system would have to change, and 
no state or alliance of states seems to be in a position to do so. 
The second point, his assertion that unipolarity is peaceful, is also grounded in the realities 
of power dynamics. “No other major power is in a position to follow any policy that depends for its 
success on prevailing against the United States in a war or an extended rivalry…At the same time, 
unipolarity minimizes security competition among the other great powers.41 Unipolarity is peaceful, 
then, because it reduces hegemonic rivalry and minimizes uncertainty. Monteiro points out that this 
peacefulness only extends to the absence of conflict between great powers. I would add that such 
direct conflict between great powers was already absent in the bipolar world.42 
As has already been discussed, Wohlforth believes that other powers cannot balance against 
the United States because of its power advantage. In World out of Balance, Brooks and Wohlforth 
write that “balance of power theory predicts that states will try to prevent the rise of a hegemon; it 
                                                
39 Ibid., 8 
40 That he attributes significance to the United States’ offshore status is faulty. It would only be significant 
through a geopolitical lens. Since the United States has committed itself to the maintenance of permanent 
alliances in Europe, and attached, both through rhetoric and strategy, vital interest status to those alliances, 
the United States’ offshore status only matters inasmuch as it is concerned with its domestic security alone. 
41 Ibid., 7 
42 The great power peacefulness could then be due to any number of things, including the institutions that 
were set up after WWII. I believe that those who than nuclear weapons for this peace are likely correct, 
although this may be affected by the fact that we are now in a second nuclear age. See Bracken.  
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tells us nothing about what will happen once a country establishes such a position.”43 Other than the 
difficulties of mobilizing one’s economy and competing against the hegemon, Brooks and 
Wohlforth note that “a final impediment to balancing is the opportunity cost of using resources and 
bending strategy toward countering the system’s strongest state.”44 They conclude that for most 
states, local conflicts escalate the opportunity costs of balancing.4546 Their ultimate point is that once 
a leader crosses into the realm of unipole status, “the causal arrows reverse: the stronger the leading 
state is and the more entrenched its dominance, the more improbable and thus less constraining 
counterbalancing dynamics are.”47 This final point against balance of power theory illuminates a key 
position of Brooks and Wohlforth, if it were not clear already: they assert that unipolarity is not only 
durable, but also self-perpetuating.  
The second realist theory Brooks and Wohlforth grapple with is the balance of threat theory. 
Conceived of by Stephen M. Walt, balance of threat theory posits that, rather than checking the 
power of the hegemon or aspiring hegemon, states will balance against perceived threats, leading to 
soft-balancing with the intention of undermining the perceived threat’s ambition. Brooks and 
Wohlforth disagree with the theory itself, claiming that “using the term balancing to describe 
bargaining amounts in practice to equating balancing with international relations writ 
large…Balancing, in short, is a systemic constraint while bargaining is governed by the specific 
constellation of interests among the states involved in a given issue.”48 It would be difficult to 
discern between soft-balancing and the natural disputes which occur between states. It would be 
difficult to observe, much less prove, that a state that acts in opposition to the United States’ agenda 
is actually acting in defiance of the United States. They write, “other states may take actions that end 
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up impeding U.S. security policy in future years, but this will ultimately depend on a constellation of 
factors particular to other societies that is unrelated to U.S. power.”49 
 
Brooks, Wohlforth, Realists, and Liberals on what a Unipolar Power Should do 
 
 On one side of the argument, Brooks and Wohlforth claim that unipolarity is durable and 
peaceful. On the other, realists claim that a unipolar power will be balanced against, and thus the 
system is short-lived. Each respective side then offers opposite advice for a unipolar power. 
Wohlforth writes, “the chief threat is U.S. failure to do enough.”50 Part of his logic stems from the 
belief that because the unipole has tremendous power to wield, it can use its power to promote and 
protect stability; “[by] exploiting the other states’ security dependence as well as its unilateral power 
advantages, the sole pole can maintain a system of alliances that keeps second-tier states out of 
trouble.”51 Not only do other states have little choice but to yield to the unipole, it is in many states’ 
interests to do so. A sustained interventionist policy is both beneficial to the United States and 
desirable to weaker states; “in each region, cobbled-together security arrangements that require an 
American role seem preferable to the available alternatives.”52 For Wohlforth, the United States has 
the responsibility as a unipolar power to promote order; “the more efficiently the United States 
performs this role, the more durable the system.”53 Again, Wohlforth builds into his unipolar 
stability theory the assumption that unipolarity is a self-perpetuating system. Wohlforth argues that 
the unipolar power is unconstrained, cannot be balanced against, and should work to control other 
states and promote stability. He does not go so far as to claim that the unipolar system is no longer 
                                                
49 Ibid., 96-97 
50 Wohlforth, Stability of a Unipolar World, 8 
51 Ibid., 25 
52 Ibid., 39 
53 Ibid., 39 
 18 
anarchical, but his argument hints at a more significant and lasting structural change than others 
before him had. 
 In the 1990’s and early 2000’s, NATO expansion was the battlefield over which the 
unipolarity debate played out. Realists opposed it, liberal scholars argued for it, and the idea of it fell 
in line with Brooks and Wohlforth’s arguments for interventionist grand strategy. Waltz writes, “the 
reasons for expanding NATO are weak. The reasons for opposing expansion are strong. It draws 
new lines of division in Europe, alienates those left out, and can find no logical stopping place west 
of Russia.”54 For Waltz and other realists, NATO expansion threatened to alienate Russia, 
something that could provoke counterbalancing in the future. Other than to maintain a presence in 
Europe and exert its power, Waltz argues that there is little reason for the United States to expand 
NATO.  
Russett writes that “the end of ideological hostility matters…because it represents a 
surrender to the force of Western values of economic and especially political freedom.”55 The 
reduction of the Soviet Union to a non-presence on the international stage made it seem as though 
the great powers were unified in their ideology. 
In Building a New NATO, Ronald D. Asmus writes that “the end of the Cold War has wiped 
away the strategic distinction between Europe's center and periphery.”56 Once the international 
system stepped away from bipolarity, the various spheres of influence that made up the Western and 
Eastern blocs were no longer viewed in strategic terms. Asmus goes on to suggest that the power 
vacuum created by the Soviet Collapse could provoke instability and undermine the progress of 
fledgling Eastern European democracies. He writes of two ‘arcs’ that formed from the dust of the 
Cold War; “The first is the eastern arc: the zone of instability running between Germany and Russia 
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from northern Europe down through Turkey, the Caucasus and middle Asia. The second is the 
southern arc, running through northern Africa and the Mediterranean into the Middle East and 
Southwest Asia.”57 He goes on to discuss how said vacuum may provoke instability by reigniting old 
rivalries, by pitting democracy against non-democratic forces, and by the possibility of these first 
two threats’ spillover into the West.58 He asserts that the West can take action to expedite and 
protect the world’s march toward a post-historical, liberal international order.  
Asmus concludes that the West must “project collective defense, democracy and security 
into the twin arcs of crisis. Such a strategy must be, first and foremost, political and economic. But 
the West must also establish a stable security framework for these regions. The obvious tool for this 
new strategy is NATO.”59 He proposes a more equal distribution of responsibility amongst the 
NATO states,60 and the acceptance of American hegemony.61 Without full European integration and 
the United States’ support, the prospects for success of his ‘new NATO’ are slim. Asmus concludes 
that “opening the EC to the East is the best guarantee against a revival of anti-Western nationalism 
and of stabilizing the process of political and economic reform.”62 This was the reigning liberal 
sentiment at the dawn of the unipolar moment; the expansion of alliances would lead to the 
promotion of stability, freedom, and democracy.
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Chapter 2:  
Three Critiques and a Theory 
 
 In the last chapter I laid out the key arguments of each side of the unipolarity durability 
debate. The realists argue against Brooks and Wohlforth and liberalism, and thus NATO expansion 
and increased interventionism. Brooks and Wohlforth argue that the system is durable, and thus 
interventionism is desirable - even necessary. Liberals argued for expansionist policy as well. In this 
chapter I will offer a critique of the former two arguments, lay out my theory regarding unipolarity’s 
durability, and expand on this theory by concluding the chapter with a positive argument against 
liberalism. 
 
Critique of Brooks and Wohlforth 
 
 Much of Brooks and Wohlforth’s argument has already been discussed. Their contention 
that unipolarity is self-perpetuating is particularly interesting when juxtaposed with arguments they 
have made in other papers, most notably Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War: Rethinking a 
Landmark Case for Ideas. In said paper, the authors analyze the policy shifts that occurred during the 
Gorbachev era and grapple with the liberal theory that ideas played a significant role in the 
retrenchment, reform, and engagement of the Soviet Union in the years leading up to its collapse. 
Brooks and Wohlforth establish that the Soviets faced relative decline that proved to be a 
disproportionate burden to them. A major cause of the outsized burden, they argue, was the nature 
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of the international system and of globalization itself. They write, “"globalization" was not global: It 
took sides in the Cold War.”63 The authors’ assessment of material pressures on the Soviet Union 
during the Gorbachev era and the time immediately preceding it effectively establishes that the 
reform efforts seemed to follow the emergence of material pressures on the Soviet Union. This 
conclusion in turn diminishes the role of ideas, although the authors claim that ideational models 
may still have a place on the micro-level.64 
 I mention this paper because it offers perhaps the best insight into the authors’ particular 
perspective; for Brooks and Wohlforth, as with the realists, the Soviet Union fell due to the 
economic burden that the bipolar system placed on it. Eventually, the Soviet Union was unable to 
keep pace with the West’s technological innovations and collapsed under the pressure. They analyze 
the Soviet fall through the lens of power dynamics and their analysis of unipolarity’s durability is 
made in this same mindset. It follows, then, that the authors believe the only way unipolarity can end 
is through a similar process of relative decline. While their argument goes against what realists claim, 
it is nonetheless an argument concerned solely with power dynamics. The problem with their 
argument isn’t that they disagree with the realists, - I will critique the realist argument shortly - the 
problem is that they go beyond discounting the possibility of counterbalancing and claim that 
unipolarity is self-perpetuating. Since Brooks and Wohlforth believe that the preponderance of the 
United States’ power prevents balancing, they believe that so long as such a level of power is 
maintained, the United States will maintain its unipolar status. They do not claim that unipolarity will 
be permanent, but their analysis offers no real insight into how it will come undone. 
 If unipolarity is self-perpetuating, the rules of the international system are structurally 
altered. Their argument for the durability of unipolarity justifies the assumption that the United 
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States no longer has to concern itself with worries over its security. This alone is valid. Indeed, the 
reduction of domestic security concerns is one of the defining features of unipolarity. However, 
when paired with an argument for interventionist policy, their theory fails to recognize the realities 
of the international system. States are still security-seeking and weary of other states’ intentions. 
Geopolitics remains of great concern to many states. Brooks and Wohlforth even emphasize this 
reality to support their theory: 
“The costs and challenges of moving military forces over long distances mean that countries 
generally pose greater threats to their neighbors than to states farther away…The Atlantic 
and Pacific oceans separate the United States from the Eurasian landmass, where all the 
prospective balancers reside…balancing the hegemon is less likely to come at the expense of 
addressing local security challenges.”65 
 
Brooks and Wohlforth bring up the comparative likelihood of neighborly disputes occurring as 
further proof that the unipolar power will not have to concern itself with balancing efforts or direct 
conflict. In a geopolitical sense, this argument makes perfect sense. The United States not only has 
the greatest buffer zone in the form of oceans, it has control over these waters. Posen refers to this 
edge as ‘the command of the commons’ and claims that it “is the key military enabler of the U.S. 
global power position.”66 What Brooks and Wohlforth fail to account for is that the United States’ 
interests and security concerns are not the same as weaker states. The United States projects its 
power beyond its borders, maintains a powerful network of alliances, and guarantees the security of 
said allies. Wohlforth acknowledges this when he argues that many states find the United States’ 
promotion and protection of stability desirable.67 While the United States has an excellent 
geopolitical buffer zone, many of its allies do not. The argument that conflict between neighboring 
states protects the unipolar power from balancing makes little sense when the unipolar power is 
intimately concerned with its allies’ security. Thus, every intervention and expansionist move the 
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United States makes extends the umbrella of its interests. Brooks and Wohlforth’s pro-expansion 
conclusion misses the point that while the United States may not have to worry about its own 
security, it has to worry about the security of its allies. Inevitably there will be times when the United 
States’ will to protect its interests is outweighed by another state’s will to malign them. Expansionist 
policy absent of strategy only increases the likelihood of this happening.  
  
Critique of Realists and Establishment of Another Theory 
 
The realist argument against unipolar durability is flawed for many of the same reasons that 
Brooks and Wohlforth’s theory is. The realist argument is also focused entirely on raw power 
dynamics. Yet, as I will suggest shortly, the unipolar system is not flawed because the structure 
provokes counterbalancing. As such, the realists misinterpret unipolarity even as they correctly 
question its durability. Brooks and Wohlforth’s counterarguments to the balance-of-power and 
balance-of-threat theories are valid. I do not believe that there is anything about unipolarity in 
particular that would provoke hard-balancing, and I agree with Brooks and Wohlforth that there is 
likely no state for which a policy of hard-balancing against the United States would be desirable or 
even possible. I also agree with Brooks and Wohlforth that it is hard to know when states are soft-
balancing and when they are simply acting in their best interests or bargaining. More broadly, I agree 
with Brooks and Wohlforth that the actual conventional power dynamics of the unipolar world are 
likely to change slowly and as a result of internal decline, rather than as a consequence of balancing 
from other states. What, then, undermines unipolarity? 
First, there is a significant result of the unipolar power’s ability, or responsibility as 
Wohlforth argues, to maintain an interventionist foreign policy. Wohlforth writes, “when the world 
was bipolar, Washington and Moscow had to think strategically whenever they contemplated taking 
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action anywhere within the system. Today there is no other power whose reaction greatly influences 
U.S. action across multiple theaters.”68 Waltz, in his criticism of NATO expansion, makes the same 
point but does so with far more insight; “NATO, led by America, scarcely considered the plight of 
its defeated adversary.”69 The United States does not have to concern itself with the reactions of 
other states in the way that it did before the era of unipolarity. Other states’ lack of influence renders 
their reactions to U.S. policy less important. 
Although unipolarity is not an absolute hierarchy,70 perception of power is drastically altered. 
The unipole faces no real security risk. This, I would suggest, is the singular element of unipolarity 
that distinguishes it from other systems. Domestic security is a secondary concern to the unipolar 
power. In the early 1990’s, following the fall of the Soviet Union, no non-allied state maintained a 
nuclear arsenal that posed a legitimate threat to the United State’s second-strike capability. No state 
in the world, then or now, posed a threat to the United States’ conventional military power. This is 
precisely what Wohlforth means when he writes that a unipole’s “capabilities are too great to be 
counterbalanced.”71 Unipolarity is defined by the reality that there is an absence of competition. In 
the absence of competition, security is naturally secondary to ambition. 
The unipolar power thus betrays itself. When a state has achieved this position in the 
international system, it ignores the transient nature of its status. The United States’ uncontested 
status won’t be permanent. Monteiro writes, “unipolarity minimizes structural constraints on grand 
strategy, and the unipole is likely to see in offensive dominance an opportunity to extract maximum 
benefits from its preponderance of power.”72 While Monteiro discusses various possible behaviors 
of unipolar powers, the other two being defensive dominance and disengagement, this tendency 
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toward offensive dominance is reflective of history and in line with a realist perspective of the 
international system. The unipole possesses a level of power that assures its security. Unipolar 
powers then have the luxury to think far beyond security when crafting strategy. 
Each of the arguments for and against unipolar durability is grounded on some conception 
of power dynamics. I would argue that each side of the durability argument misses an important 
reality of what power is and, as a result, fails to properly account for how the system itself plays out. 
My argument is straightforward: a unipole does not have to concern itself with security in 
the same way that a great power in a bi- or multipolar system would; because of this, the unipolar 
power can commit itself to a grand strategy based on liberal ideology rather than on strategic 
thinking; because liberalism fails to understand the realities of the international system, the unipole 
will undermine itself by over-expanding and overcommitting. Thus, the issue with unipolarity is not 
that other states will balance against the unipole, but that the unipole will expand beyond its vital 
interests and commit to projects, states, and positions with little strategic rationale behind them. 
This works fine in a world in which strategy does not matter, but if the unipole’s expansionist moves 
are contested by another power, then the question of raw power matters less than the question of 
Clausewitzian-defined power. That is, a combination of means and will. The United States’ means 
are unparalleled, but in certain situations its will can prove to be inferior. This has little to do with 
counterbalancing. It is an outcome of the fact that the United States’ policy is not in line with its 
strategic interests, due to the fact that the United States could pursue an ideologically driven policy 
when no power contested its hegemony. Today, Russia is still not a security threat to the United 
States or its vital interests, but it has taken actions that call into question the validity of the 





Means and Will: Competition over Interests 
 
 To understand why this question of validity exists, a brief explication of Clausewitzian theory 
is necessary. The United States’ preponderance of power allowed for expansionist, ideological policy. 
The United States’ advantage of means and lack of a rival rendered the element of will, for a time, 
obsolete. The era of ideological hostility had seemingly come to an end, so the United States’ means 
outweighed the wills of other states. One half of what Clausewitz defines as power was disregarded. 
It is important to remember it here.  
On War is often used as a footnote for famous quotes. Of those, the quote, “war is nothing 
but a duel on a larger scale,” is used with particular frequency and unfortunately must again be used 
here.73 Clausewitz goes on to explain that war can be thought of as a wrestling match in which the 
two opposing forces muscle out between each other until there is a victor. War it is a first and 
foremost a test of will. It only begins once a defensive action has taken place. In Book VI he writes,  
“War comes into being more for the benefit of the defender than for that of the conqueror 
for not till the invasion has called forth the defense does war begin. A conqueror is always a 
lover of peace (as Bonaparte constantly asserted of himself); he would like to make his entry 
into our state unopposed.”74 
 
War is a defensive choice that an attacked party makes. This fact is particularly important in the 
modern context. For one, the United States is a status-quo power. Secondly, alliances between great 
powers and minor powers complicate the picture of who the defensive actor is. Furthermore, 
modern great powers, Brodie writes, have “the luxury (or burden) of thinking in terms of national 
responsibility rather than simply of national peril.”75 Because great powers can afford to make their 
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voices heard far beyond the confines of their borders, they often feel a right or duty to do so. The 
decision to defend often comes from whichever great power a minor power has hitched itself to. 
 This decision is based upon a calculus of will, as Clausewitz explains. To start a war the 
defense must have sufficient will to resist. Once begun war becomes a test of will. Clausewitz writes 
that states “proportion [their] effort to [their enemy’s] power of resistance.”76 He defines power as 
“the extent of the means at [one’s] disposal and the strength of his will.”77 Of course one party can 
have a far greater will and still be overcome due to the extent of their opponent’s means. However, 
the strength of will cannot be measured so easily or accurately as the extent of means. The strength 
of will is directly related to what object is at stake and the interests involved. 
 Each side in a conflict resists to the extent that it can or will. The ‘able’ is obvious; a state’s 
capability depends upon factors of technology, resources, the size of its military, its economy, its 
geographic placement and other calculable factors of this sort.78 The ‘willing’ is less concrete but it is 
vital to understanding the reality of power dynamics in the unipolar world. The ‘willing’ is the 
investment a state has in the political object that is the cause of the conflict. Clausewitz writes, “the 
smaller the sacrifice we demand from our adversary, the slighter we may expect his efforts to be to 
refuse it to us.”79 The political object being the demanded sacrifice; “the standard alike to be attained 
by military action and for the efforts required for this purpose.”80 Victory can be attained by the 
state with greater military capability, but the amount of effort said state must expend on the seizure 
of the political object at stake is entirely dependent upon the amount of resistance the other state is 
willing to display. The effort of the former and the resistance of the latter are dependent upon the 
value of the political object. 
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 There are reciprocal actions that push conflict toward extremes. Conflicts would regularly 
escalate toward total war were it not for the fact that effort expended is proportional to the 
perceived value of the political object. Total war does not occur unless the political object one state 
demands from another is so essential to both states that each will refuse to expend anything less 
than maximum effort. In Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, Kissinger notes the instances of total war; 
sixteenth and seventeenth century religious wars, the wars of the French Revolution, the World 
Wars, and perhaps, he notes, the American Civil War.81 These wars, Kissinger writes, were fought 
over a schism or represented a revolutionary struggle.82 Unless a conflict took place over such a 
schism, states would avoid and moderate away from total war. In the modern context, when great 
powers avoid conflict with each other in part due to the fear of total war, direct conflict is rarely 
even considered a possibility. This could be due to democratic peace or nuclear peace. Regardless, 
great powers go to lengths to avoid direct conflict with other great powers. 
 What a state defines as a vital interest is subjective and changes over time. Brodie writes that 
modern American vital interests “concern those issues in our foreign affairs that are thought to 
affect the survival or security of the nation, meaning specifically security against military attack.”83 
For most modern states, the same is true. The paramount interest of a state is to secure its 
sovereignty. However, as states grow in capability, the list of interests that fall under the umbrella of 
‘vital’ expands:  
“A nation ready to resort to aggression to gain its ends is enlarging its conception of its vital 
interests. However, such aggression, too, has often been justified by its perpetrator on the 
ground of its alleged necessity to the security of the state, and this allegation has sometimes 
been sincerely meant.”84  
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Ultimately, the definition of a vital interest will be that its protection or procurement is essential to 
the security of the state. A unipolar power has an increased ability to expand beyond sovereignty and 
security when determining what its vital interests are. However, the will to do so must be great 
enough to outmatch their opponent’s will to block their aims. Clausewitz writes, “the less important 
our political object, the less will be the value we attach to it and the readier shall we abandon it. For 
this reason also our own efforts will be the slighter.”85 If, for example, the combination of the 
United States’ means and will outweighed that of its adversary, its ambition would go unchecked. In 
the 1990’s, I would suggest, the United States’ means were so great and Russia’s so reduced that the 
factor of will was ignored. 
 All of this is to say, a political object is only defended if a state has the means and motivation 
to defend it. Brooks and Wohlforth and the realists focus too much on the means element of this 
equation. The United States’ power is uncontested. It would not be in any state’s interest to trespass 
against the United States’ vital interests. However, there are many security concerns the United 
States still has to confront even though it is safe from direct attack or hard-balancing. It would not 
be in the United States’ interest to engage in any sort of direct conflict with another great power. 
Since unipolarity allowed for the United States to expand its umbrella of influence, there are now 
allies that may be of more significance to other great powers than they are to the United States, or 
even the West. Protecting these allies, and protecting liberal projects, may be less vital to the United 
States’ security than avoiding the possibility of conflict. It is here that the folly of unipolarity should 
be made clear; the misunderstanding of power dynamics and the misinterpretation of the meaning of 
the Soviet collapse allowed for liberal ideology to dominate strategy. The United States, acting as an 
uncontested unipolar power, committed to expanding the liberal democratic project. But the nature 
of the international system and the nature of politics did not change along with the post-Soviet 
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structural shift. The preponderance of the United States’ power allowed for it to act as though it did. 
Again, this is not the same as counterbalancing. Other states do not seem to be reacting to the 
United States’ power to balance against it or the perception of a threat. The United States simply 
enmeshed its vital interests with lesser interests because, for a time, there did not seem to be a 
strategic reason to do otherwise. 
 
Argument Against Liberalism 
 
So far, I have claimed the following: Brooks and Wohlforth are wrong for thinking the 
unipolar system durable and self-perpetuating; the realists are wrong for framing their argument as a 
balance of power issue; that both sides of the durability argument fail to understand the nature of 
power dynamics; and that unipolarity is self-undermining because the unipole’s security allows for it 
to disregard strategy and pursue policy based on liberal ideology. Before demonstrating how the 
United States acted this way in regard to NATO expansion, I must first explain why liberalism is 
fallible and why a grand strategy structured on ideology is strategically unwise. 
The dawn of the unipolar moment was a triumph for liberalism and was viewed as a 
resounding defeat of realism. In his farewell address, Gorbachev said that he was “convinced that 
the democratic reform that we launched in the spring of 1985 was historically correct.”86 Even as the 
Soviet Union fell apart, Gorbachev proclaimed his confidence in the democratic system. His 
perestroika and glasnost reforms were widely criticized and reviled. Uskoreniie, the broad Soviet 
policy of acceleration, had not succeeded in its mission of rescuing the state from collapse. The 
predicament should have been obvious. Soviet democratic reforms were viewed as failures The 
Russian Federation would hinge upon the successful implementation of democratic and capitalist 
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reforms. Instead, shock therapy was introduced. Most chalked the failure of the Soviet Union up to 
the failure of its ideology. The success of Western ideology in Russia would be of great importance, 
however no Marshall plan equivalent was put in place. This in itself may be the root cause of 
modern-day strife between the West and Russia. Disregarding this, though, the Soviet collapse was 
viewed as an ideological conflict that the West had won. The scholarship written on the event 
informed the grand strategy of the United States during the unipolar moment. 
In 1989, Fukuyama wrote, “[that] the triumph of the West, of the Western idea, is evident 
first of all in the total exhaustion of viable systematic alternatives to Western liberalism.”87 This 
would serve as the thesis and conclusion of liberal scholars at the dawn of the unipolar moment. All 
other ideologies had been proven ‘wrong,’ the argument goes. Somewhat ironically, as many connect 
the threads between Clausewitz’s philosophizing and Hegel’s dialectic, Fukuyama draws from 
Hegel’s concept of the end of history. For Hegel, the end of history represented a moment in which 
humankind would conclude its ideological struggle, or, as Fukuyama puts it, “a moment in which a 
final, rational form of society and state [becomes] victorious.”88 Fukuyama and others believed that 
the time had come. 
 The end of history necessitates the end of realism, as realism is inherently concerned with 
geopolitics and has no place in a post-historical world. Fukuyama’s proclamation of the end of 
history contributed greatly to the idea the era of geopolitics was over. From the beginning, there was 
a belief that the establishment of unipolarity represented some permanent paradigm shift. It was an 
utter disregard of a Clausewitzian principle; “the defeated state often see it [itself, in defeat] in only a 
transitory evil, for which a remedy can yet be found in the political circumstances of a later day.”89. 
Clausewitz writes, “[that] disarming or the overthrow of the enemy…must always be the aim of 
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military action.”90 The Soviet Union was disarmed and overthrown, but the state itself was not 
entirely destroyed. Kennan understood this decades before Soviet collapse was in sight. Russia itself, 
not communism, was the geopolitical threat. Communism had failed Russia but the state itself had 
not. As such, there was always the prospect that the Russian state would remain a geopolitical rival. 
Of course, the capabilities of Russia both as an economic and military rival have been drastically 
diminished. Russia as it stands today is a single-source economy; its prosperity is intimately attached 
with the value of oil. Russia also faces profound demographic and border problems, as it has since 
the time of Catherine II. Nonetheless, the resurgence of Russia’s ability to project its power beyond 
its borders suggests that, regardless of its actual power or its domestic issues, the state is set on 
playing the game of geopolitics. 
Russett contextualizes the Soviet collapse as a surrender to the Western values of economic 
and political freedom, rather than the success of decades of containment and arms races. Pure 
realism, theoretically, ignores the impact of domestic factors and ideological characteristics. Surely 
the United States was able to win such a contest due in large part to its ideology.91 Internal variables 
obviously affect a state’s ability to grow and thus compete in the international system. To claim that 
such differences are irrelevant ignores a major facet of the global system. But realists are correct in 
their evaluation of the nature of that system, that it is based in power and the question of security. 
As with other scholars, Asmus makes the misstep of embracing realism as an antidote to the 
realist system. Even as he mentions the existence of  “residual fears about the threat of a possibly 
resurgent Russia - a nation that has itself demonstrated real signs of instability, the potential for a 
shift to the right and flirtations with imperial restoration,”92 Asmus fails to acknowledge the strategic 
implications of provoking such a state and instead argues that NATO expansion “remains the best 
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guarantee for securing democracy in Europe and guarding against the revival of destructive 
nationalism.”93 
It is clear with this policy prescription that Asmus is focused on the maintenance of security 
inasmuch as it applies to the spread of democracy. The military presence of the United States and 
other European powers, the cooperation between the states, the acceptance of American power, and 
the distribution of burden between member states - each of these suggestions is oriented around 
power and built upon structure, all with the end goal of preserving and promoting the spread of 
liberal ideology. The rationale of NATO expansion, or at least Asmus’ rationale, was that geopolitics 
was over and the West’s ideology had won out. 
Asmus’ argument is grounded in the liberal idea that alliances promote stability. On alliances, 
Russett writes,  
“Allies may be presumed to choose each other because of their common interests, and 
hence to be already peacefully inclined toward each other. Moreover, their common interests 
are likely to concern security against a common enemy; if so, they are not likely to fight each 
other. Many democracies have shared common interests in presenting a unified alliance 
front.”94  
 
Alliances promote stability and peace due to the fact that those engaged in alliances often share 
common interests and, once allied, are incentivized to behave cooperatively. This liberal idea makes 
sense in a multipolar or bipolar system, when there are sides to be balanced against. However, in a 
unipolar system in which the relevance of the balance of power is greatly diminished, alliance 
making can trend toward the unnecessarily oppositional rather than the stability promoting. In a 
unipolar world, democratic alliances that claim to stand in unison for the simple goal of promoting 
their shared values create a needless dichotomy between those states that are acceptable and those 
that are not. This is a natural impulse for liberal theorists who evaluate states on their ‘goodness.’ In 
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a unipolar world, when there is no rival great power to balance against, alliance making presents a 
unified front that is inherently asymmetrical in power to those states excluded from the process and 
its product. 
Alliances are formed to unify against an external force. Alliances are power balancing and 
strategic, yet Asmus and others pushed for such expansion with the thought in mind that the time of 
ideological conflict had come to an end. Alliance expansion would then simply serve to promote 
shared values. Theorists in the early 1990’s attempted to advance the democratic project by 




Chapter 3:  
 
NATO Enlargement as a Unipolarity Case Study 
 
 
On Christmas day of 1991, the Soviet Union officially fell. Its collapse represented the end 
of the Cold War and the beginning of the ‘unipolar moment.’ The United States would become 
hegemon without equal; the system of geopolitical balancing appeared to be over. In the following 
years, the U.S. and its Western allies would enjoy the peacefulness of the post-historical age by 
pursuing an ideological agenda without regard to strategy. Since there was no power to balance U.S. 
action the West could advance its project of democratic expansionism without real opposition from 
other great powers. A major aspect of the expansion project would be the enlargement of NATO.  
In 1990, NATO expanded to include East Germany. In 1999 NATO welcomed the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, and Poland. Hungary shares a border with Ukraine while Poland, which had 
been under Soviet control since WWII, shares a border with Kaliningrad Oblast. In 2004, NATO 
expansion included seven states, two of which border Ukraine - Slovakia and Romania. Three of the 
states added in 2004 were former Soviet states and are Baltic States. Of these three, Estonia and 
Latvia border mainland Russia while Lithuania borders Kaliningrad Oblast. In five years, NATO 
expanded to the Russian border and its new members encircled Kaliningrad Oblast, a population 
center, and now Russia’s only ice-free port in the Baltic Sea. 
 Russian officials continually opposed the expansion and expressed fears on the basis of not 
only prestige, but security. Government officials and analysts continually dismissed these protests, 
and the organization’s enlargement continued. In 2016, the United States finds itself in a far less 
secure position. Recent revisionist behavior from Putin’s Russia has forced U.S. officials to consider 
the possibility of actually having to make good on the security assurances NATO’s newest members 
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were given. Putin’s actions have cast doubt on the idea that the U.S. will indeed stand by Article V. 
While Estonia and Latvia may not be of vital interest to the United States, Western European 
countries certainly are. The United States’ ability to deter Russian revisionist behavior or to ensure 
the security of NATO’s newest and easternmost members in the case of Russian aggression will 
impact the validity of NATO as a whole and the validity of the U.S. as a stable unipolar power. 
In this chapter I will offer a history of NATO expansion, from the fall of the Soviet Union 
up to modern day. By detailing the way in which NATO expansion occurred, I aim to illustrate that 
the enlargement project was not only ideologically driven, but also dismissive of a continuous flow 
of protestations from Russian officials. In the earliest stages of NATO expansion, many argued that 
these protests, if yielded to, would amount to a Russian ‘veto’ over certain states’ prospective 
accessions into the organization. However, Russia’s continued use of narrative in which promises 
were made and broken, gentlemen’s agreements were scorned, and red lines were drawn and stepped 
over signals that the issue of NATO enlargement was always of great concern to the state’s 
geopolitical influence, prestige, and security. Rather than pause at the Russian disapproval of 
expansion the West continued with the project, often citing the advancement and protection of 
democracy as its reason for doing so. Significantly as well, the leaders of prospective member states 
in Eastern Europe often cited security concerns vis a vis Russia as a central reason for joining the 
organization. The parties involved in this process can be broken into three broad groups: the most 
powerful states in NATO, Eastern European prospective/future members, and Russia. The latter 
two groups were consistently explicit about their perceptions of the organization; both groups 
viewed the enlargement process as a security concern albeit those concerns being opposite. The 
existence of Russia’s will regarding NATO expansion was always clear, but it was ignored. 
 
The Soviet Fall 
 37 
 
Reflecting on the material pressures the Soviet Union faced in its final years, Medvedev 
commented, “it became obvious that without a reduction in military expenditures, it would not be 
possible to resolve the urgent socioeconomic problems…[This situation] stimulated the 
development of a new military doctrine and a new foreign policy aimed at stopping the arms race.”95 
His understanding of the fall is simple; the Soviet Union could literally no longer afford to oppose 
the West.96 In 1991 Gorbachev’s farewell address struck a greatly different, ideologically-
impassioned tone, but his reforms were vastly unpopular, he was forced out of office, and succeeded 
by a political rival - whose own successor would be Vladimir Putin. While Gorbachev himself 
praised democracy, there was little reason to think that the people of Russia and their leaders had 
embraced Western values as well. The end of the Cold War should, then, have been interpreted as 
the temporary end of conflict between the West and Russia rather than as the end of ideological 
competition. Mearsheimer and other realists expressed these doubts.  
He credits the post-1945 European peace to bipolarity, parity in power, and the presence of 
nuclear weaponry, not to ideological progression.97 “Relations among the EC states were spared the 
effects of anarchy—fears about relative gains and an obsession with autonomy—because the United 
States served as the ultimate arbiter within the alliance,”98 he writes. During the Cold War power was 
concentrated between two poles and their military power was so great that the benefits for going to 
war were very limited. Mearsheimer points out the possibility that the Cold War was not won on the 
basis of ideology, and thus the international system might not see more or permanent stability. He 
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writes, “the Soviet Union also might eventually threaten the new status quo. Soviet withdrawal from 
Eastern Europe does not mean that the Soviets will never feel compelled to return to Eastern 
Europe.”99 This, however, was the assumption that the West seemed to operate on. 
Many assumed that the fall of the Soviet Union meant the death of geopolitics. NATO 
expansion and Clintonian democratic expansionism were carried out with the thought that liberal 
ideology had won the Cold War. This ignored the argument that Kennan had made at the dawn of 
the Cold War, that the conflict was chiefly with Russia, not communism. Regardless, the action 
taken by the U.S. and the West was in the name of an ideology, not strategy or security. The West’s 
behavior during this period seems to echo the behavior of a state that is certain it can win an all-out 
war. Due to the weakness of Russia during this time, it seems as though the West acted as the victor 
of an all-out war of ideologies.100 The West’s lack of strategy in its expansion signals toward its 
confidence that there would no longer be conflict with Russia or a need for extended deterrence 
against it. The U.S bet - and bet wrong - that the age of geopolitics was over. The U.S. acted under 
the assumption that its capability and Russia’s inability to exert its will were permanent realities. 
Ronald D. Asmus writes that in the early stages of drafting the NATO enlargement study, 
“an initial round of ‘brainstorming sessions’ had led to agreement on a set of core ideas. The first 
was that enlargement’s rationale was to expand integration and stability in Europe eastward, and not 
a strategic response to a specific threat from Russia. A second was that there would be no ‘second 
class’ membership. New members would share both the benefits and risks of membership.”101 The 
latter idea highlights that each NATO member has an equal responsibility to the others. While this 
ostensibly makes sense, to ensure that the burdens of the Alliance are shared by all, it has an obvious 
flaw; from a strategic standpoint, all members are not equal. The former ‘core idea’ emphasizes that 
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the Alliance’s new raison d'être is the protection of democracy and not of strategic interests. The 
organization would still exist as a military alliance, but without a threat to counterbalance. Instability 
was the threat that the post-Cold War NATO would protect against. Still, NATO membership came 
with a security assurance and inclusion in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. 
In 1993, Steven Larrabee, Richard Kugler, and Ronald D. Asmus published a piece in Foreign 
Affairs entitled “Building a New NATO.” It would become one of the earliest and most prominent 
public arguments for NATO expansion. In it, the three argue that in order to ensure stability and to 
curb nationalistic violence, NATO must be expanded. They acknowledge the fear that Russia would 
see expansion as a threat, but claim that “ it is hard to understand how supporting democracy and 
stability in Eastern Europe can undercut democracy in Russia.”102 Aside from ignoring the obvious 
concern that the encroachment of a security alliance up to one’s borders would raise, they overlook 
the fact that NATO was created to counter the Soviet Union, and its expansion to the exclusion of 
Russia could likely be seen as a continuation of Cold War strategic doctrine, even if it were not 
intended as such. 
 
Clinton and Democratic Expansionism 
 
In spite of initial opposition from Russia, members of Clinton’s own party, and from U.S. 
allies, the argument for NATO expansion grew in support. Former Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbott noted that “there were more people against it than were for it…most of [what] the 
arguments came down to was [that] the Russians didn’t like it.”103 Russian opposition to the 
expansion was the main argument against it. Rather than giving Russian concern deference, though, 
this argument was eventually turned on its head as a reason for enlargement. As Talbott notes, the 
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argument became that the U.S. and the West “couldn’t give Russia a veto over the right of what 
were now independent countries to join the alliance.”104 This meant that NATO’s open-door policy 
would be truly open for any state that met its standards of democracy and stability, with the implicit 
statement that Russia should have no ability to subordinate a sovereign state’s will over its strategic 
aims. NATO’s evolution during the unipolar moment placed a higher value on the sovereignty of 
minor states than on Russia’s security goals. 
“Clinton was under pressure to prove his and his party’s foreign policy credentials. Not only 
had the Democrats been out of power for twelve years, but also they were still viewed by the public 
as less competent than Republicans on national security issues.”105 The Republicans supported 
NATO expansion. When Gingrich’s House Republicans released their Contract With America, one of 
the ten proposed bills was the “National Security [Revitalization] Act.” The act called for the 
expansion of NATO, and the Contract With America was a highly public statement of the highest line 
items on the Republican agenda.106 Though the act itself did not pass in the Senate, the Republican 
call for NATO expansion likely influenced the Clinton Administration. 
In April of 1993, Vaclav Havel, the president of the Czech Republic, met with Clinton to 
discuss the prospect of his country joining NATO. He told Clinton that “the issue is not that we are 
faced with imminent threats. Rather, we are in the process of undergoing an image transformation - 
a reshaping of our identity…entry into NATO and the EC is central to expanding democracy.”107 
Havel’s argument was an image-based one; NATO membership represented a state’s ascension into 
the Western liberal democratic order. Lech Walesa, the president of Poland, met with Clinton soon 
after to explain his reasons for joining NATO: “we are all afraid of Russia,” he said.108 Clinton later 
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stated that the Central and Eastern European leaders knew that NATO would “provide a security 
umbrella to its members.”109 For the members-to-be, the security assurance that came with NATO 
membership was the driving factor behind their desire to join. But the Clinton administration was 
more concerned with building a relationship with Russian reformers than crafting a new 
containment strategy against the state. “As a ‘New Democrat,’” Asmus writes, “Clinton believed 
expanding democracy should be a key foreign policy priority.”110 The expansion of NATO meant 
the expansion of democracy; Clinton pushed for the expansion of the Alliance based on the goal of 
spreading ideology, not security. 
 James M. Goldgeier, in a 2003 article entitled Not When But Who, published by the NATO 
review, wrote that “President Yeltsin tried unsuccessfully to get President Clinton to shake hands in 
Helsinki in March 1997 on a "gentleman's agreement" that the Baltic nations of Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania would never become NATO members. Since then, Russia has had to accept that it is 
unable to prevent these countries from joining the Alliance.”111 Yeltsin’s “gentlemen’s agreement” 
was the only tool he had to try and prevent the loss of a political object Russia valued more than the 
United States and the West did. The West’s confidence that Russia had no ability to resist led to the 
expansion of the treaty organization right up to the Russian border. NATO expansion was carried 
out with the understanding that Russia “had to accept”112 it and the misbelief that this would always 
be the case. 
At the International Security Conference in 1999, Russia’s deputy foreign minister Yevgeny 
Gusarov went beyond the request of a “gentlemen’s agreement.” Gusarov “said Moscow had drawn 
a "red line" on further eastward expansion of NATO into lands of the former Soviet Union, such as 
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the Baltic states of Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia.”113 Even more boldly, he equated NATO 
expansion with the "destruction of the existing world order."114 Gusarov made this calmer statement 
as well: “We hope the NATO alliance will act in the common European interests as an important 
element of the European security structure. We do not want a recurrence of confrontation with 
NATO.”115 With this appeal, Gusarov seems to clearly ask NATO’s member states to consider his 
state’s interests and avoid expansionist moves that would threaten Russia’s security. While the 
former statements delve into hyperbole, this request is a restrained attempt to deter the alliance from 
expanding up to Russia’s border, something that would be perceived as a geopolitical threat.  
Later that year, at the 1999 meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C., 
NATO added three member countries to its organization and updated its strategic concept. The 
press release details the reaffirmation of Article X and the approval of a ‘Membership Action Plan’ 
to vet aspiring members and prepare for their admission. The press release states: “Our commitment 
to enlargement is part of a broader strategy of projecting stability and working together with our 
Partners to build a Europe whole and free…The three new members will not be the last…we also 
recognize and welcome continuing efforts and progress in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.”116 At the 
same time it updated its strategic concept, with the mission of building “a Europe whole and free”117 
to the exclusion of Russia, NATO listed the Baltic States as potential future members. In short, 
Yeltsin explicitly asked Clinton to not allow for NATO expansion into the Baltics; Russia’s deputy 
foreign minister claimed that doing so would cross a red line that would threaten the international 
order. There was pronounced protest from the Russian side on the basis of security, the expansion 
occurred on the basis of ideology. 
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Bush and the Baltics 
 
In 2016, Goldgeier updated his analysis regarding Yeltsin’s acceptance of Russia’s inability to 
stop NATO expansion. Goldgeier writes, “Yeltsin was not placated, but he was too weak to push 
back. And the simmer in Moscow regarding what was seen as U.S. humiliation of Russia in the 
1990s grew to a boil by 2008, when Vladimir Putin decided he had enough of the alliance’s push 
eastwards and went to war to prevent Georgia from moving closer to NATO membership.”118 Here, 
with the wisdom of hindsight, Goldgeier writes of Russian repudiation of NATO expansion as 
though it was inevitability. To some extent, it was. Since the beginning of NATO expansion and the 
fall of the Soviet Union Russian officials have made it clear that NATO expansion is viewed as a 
security threat. Russia has always been willing, yet unable, to fight over what it views as an essential 
political object - its security. The United States has been able to expand NATO and the ideology of 
liberal democracy due to its strategic superiority, but now finds itself perhaps unwilling to fight over 
what it views as non-essential political objects - the very states it let under its security umbrella while 
history was over and geopolitics was dead. 
In 1997 the Belarusian government press voiced concerns over NATO expansion. A NATO 
document published in 1999, five years before the Baltic States would join, listed the Belarusian 
government’s concerns, its sharpest being the claim that “NATO's decision to extend the Alliance to 
the east was a strategic mistake. This was a mistake in building a new Europe and in structuring the 
entire system of international relations.” 
The Baltic States were invited to join NATO during George W. Bush’s presidency. In 2003, 
on the day that the states were admitted into the organization, Bush delivered a speech in which he 
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stated, “the United States Senate voted unanimously to support NATO admission for Bulgaria, 
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. These heroic nations have survived 
tyranny. They have won their liberty and earned their place among free nations. America has always 
considered them friends, and we will always be proud to call them allies.”119 Bush consistently 
employed such ideological rhetoric but the choice to use it here, in the context of a security alliance, 
only further demonstrates the lack of strategy that went into NATO’s expansion. The logic driving 
the Baltic States’ inclusion was grounded on their ‘survival of tyranny’ and the idea that they had 
“earned their place among free nations.”120 Indeed, the House bill in support of the Baltic States’ 
NATO accession simply stipulates the following: 
 
“Whereas former Secretary of Defense Perry stipulated five generalized standards for 
entrance into NATO: support for democracy, including toleration of ethnic diversity and 
respect for human rights; building a free market economy; civilian control of the military; 
promotion of good neighborly relations; and development of military interoperability with 
NATO; Whereas each of these Baltic countries has satisfied these standards for entrance 
into NATO.”121 
 
The Senate would go on to ratify the treaty introducing these states into NATO with a vote 
of 96-0. 122 The Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chair called it “another important step toward 
making Europe whole and free.”123  The vote took place on the 58th anniversary of Nazi Germany’s 
surrender.124 These states could have enjoyed their liberalization without being granted Article V 
security assurances. The expansion of the security community was largely symbolic; a way to set in 
stone each territorial gain that the liberal democratic order had made while Russia looked on during 
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the U.S. unipolar moment. The expansion was certainly made possible due to the mismatch of 
power, Russian officials expressed concern and disagreement but the United States and its Western 
allies seemed certain that no provocation would result in retaliation.  
In a 2002 article for the NATO Review, The Silence of the Bear, Dmitri Trenin notes that “the 
aspect of NATO enlargement which generates greatest passion in Russian policy circles is the 
likelihood of membership invitations being offered to Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania…this is 
problematic because it would, for the first time, bring the Alliance onto the territory of the former 
Soviet Union, which, from the Russian perspective, is the only issue that matters…the loss of 
superpower status has been a painful process and the admission of the Baltic states into NATO 
would mean crossing another important, though largely symbolic, threshold.”125 While increased 
stability was consistently touted as the rationale behind expansion, one still must wonder what 
strategic benefit, if any, the U.S. and the West received from crossing Russia’s most “important 
thresholds,” from provoking Russia on “the only issue that matters.”126 Trenin was not the only one 
to point out the value Russia placed on the Baltic States and he was certainly not the only one to 
dismiss the matter, others have already been cited. He calls the threshold he mentions symbolic, yet 
since the fall of the Soviet Union Russian officials made a point of emphasizing that the Baltic States 
were valued as vital political objects.  
Many Russian officials, including Putin who was the state’s leader during the Baltic NATO 
expansion, were members of the old guard. Such explicit Western influence over former Soviet 
Territory may have been perceived in the way that a seizure of homeland territory would have been. 
The West, however, viewed the expansion of the organization and the security assurances that went 
along with it as symbolic gestures because the West did not expect to have to provide security for its 
new members against a geopolitically minded aggressor. If the U.S. and the West did expect to have 
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to make good on the assurances, advocates for expansion might have taken Russian concerns into 
greater account. The simple fact is that the NATO could expand at this moment, so it did. If the 
West believed that Russia would one day use force to retaliate against the expansions made during 
the unipolar moment, no one would have advocated for adding states that Russia viewed as vital 
political objects to NATO. If Russia were to have the ability, it certainly would have the will.  
For Russia and for Yeltsin, the idea of Baltic States joining NATO was an issue of prestige, 
security, and strategy. Clinton denied making such a gentlemen’s agreement with Yeltsin, but the pill 
he made Yeltsin swallow has since been spit up by Putin. With the 2008 annexations in Georgia, 
Russia gained a foothold in a former Soviet state. Although the annexed regions do not, the state 
itself borders Turkey, a NATO ally. Since, no security agreement bound the United States to protect 
Georgian sovereignty, the annexation was roundly criticized but met with little action. In 2014, with 
the annexation of Crimea, Russia gained influence in Ukraine that it has continued to expand 
through the exploitation of ongoing conflict in the state. Ukraine shares a border with NATO states 
Romania, Hungary, Slovakia, and Poland. As with Georgia, Crimea and the current areas of conflict 
do not border these states. And as with Georgia, Russia’s actions were condemned but not 
confronted. The Russian presence in these states leads to a continued sense of instability and 
uncertainty. Both Georgia and Ukraine were possible candidates for the NATO membership action 
plan. The pro-Russian and now ousted Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovich abandoned 
aspirations of joining NATO in 2010, but after the revolution Obama rejected the idea that either 
state would be invited to join NATO anytime soon. In a 2014 speech, he stated, “neither Ukraine or 
Georgia are currently on a path to NATO membership. And there has not been any immediate 
plans for expansion of NATO's membership."127 Obama’s statements directly contradict NATO 
documents that claim the organization is making efforts to “help Georgia advance in its preparations 
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towards membership.”128 This statement “was understood by Moscow as Russia’s veto power over 
the enlargement of the alliance.”129 Russian aggression over the past eight years has undermined the 
credibility of the United States’ security assurances and its deterrence threat. Russian action in 
Georgia and Ukraine led first to the United States’ rejection of the NATO enlargement project. 
While, for years, many believed that Russia was unable to resist the expansion of NATO, once such 
resistance came the United States abandoned the idea of spreading the organization any further. This 
showed that the United States would not pursue its ideological agenda if such pursuit posed any 
threat to its security.  
Russia’s actions correlate to U.S. response; the U.S. had no responsibility toward Georgia. 
Although Ukraine was not a NATO member, Russian action in 2014 certainly breached the 
Budapest Memorandums. The memorandums are vague, but the U.S made some level of 
commitment to protect Ukraine’s sovereignty. U.S. failure to respond to this situation with strength 
gave Putin a bigger gain than Crimea: the ability to chip away at U.S. credibility. Putin has 
successfully used a “salami-slicing” strategy, in the words of Thomas Schelling, to undermine U.S. 
credibility and thus U.S. power. Putin has escalated his aggression to test the boundaries of U.S. 
patience. The result has been clear: the United States will not intervene in situations where its vital 
interests are not at stake. Even in Syria, where Russian involvement has directly disrupted U.S. 
strategy, the United States has done little to combat Putin’s actions. Putin has successfully put an 
end to the democratic expansionist era and is steadily casting doubt on the United States’ credibility 
as the unipolar power and a security ally. With Russia’s annexation of Crimea and regions of 
Georgia, the Federation’s presence can now be felt by 4 more NATO states. The gains made during 
the unipolar moment are falling to apart due to Putin’s exposure of the modern U.S. deterrence 
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problem. The U.S. is unwilling to expend effort beyond that of Russia’s on non-vital political 
objects, such as Ukraine. 
In 2016, the RAND corporation published a report from David A. Shlapak and Michael W. 
Johnson entitled Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank. The report detailed findings from a 
series of wargames the center conducted in 2014 to assess the possibility of Russian conventional 
aggression against NATO’s Baltic members. Shlapak and Johnson concluded that “as currently 
postured, NATO cannot successfully defend the territory of its most exposed members.”130 “The 
longest it has taken Russian forces to reach the outskirts of the Estonian and/or Latvian capitals of 
Tallinn and Riga, respectively,” they write, “is 60 hours.”131 The pair concludes that NATO must 
either expand its military presence in the Baltics or consider the implications of three potential 
consequences of inaction. Escalation, threats of nuclear response, or capitulation.132 In a piece for 
War on the Rocks, Michael Kofman critiqued the RAND report by claiming that, among other things, 
an increase of NATO forces in the Baltics would not mitigate Russia’s geographic advantages. He 
writes, “there’s no need to seize Baltic cities since they can simply walk through Belarus and link up 
with Kaliningrad, thereby severing NATO’s “Army of Deterrence” in the Baltics from the rest of its 
forces in Poland.”133 Adding military might in the Baltics would not necessarily deter a hostile 
Russian force. If anything, it could provoke direct confrontation or a security dilemma. 
In an article for the American Interest entitled Can NATO Defend the Baltics? Kirk Bennett pulls 
from both RAND’s findings and Kofman’s critique to offer alternative strategic responses to 
hypothetical Russian aggression. Bennett asks a simple question; “if Russia can strike where it enjoys 
an overwhelming advantage, why can’t NATO also strike back precisely where Russia itself is most 
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vulnerable?”134 In his opinion, those points of strike-back would be of a non-military nature: seizure 
of assets, expulsion of Russia from SWIFT, a halting of lending from Western banks.135 If conflict 
were inevitable, NATO members’ superior naval capacity could interrupt Russia’s mission in Syria.136 
Each of his suggestions relies upon the same idea; if Russia were to attack the Baltics, NATO would 
have ways of confronting the situation indirectly. 
Of course, as members of the Alliance, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania have the same security 
assurances as any other NATO members. The Baltic States’ sovereignty is, ostensibly, protected by 
Article V of the treaty. For this exact reason the hypothetical responses to Russian aggression 
offered by Shlapak and Johnson, Kofman, and Bennett all share the same flaw; each author, aside 
from the RAND authors to an extent, attempts to circumvent the fact that NATO has provided the 
Baltic states with security assurances. The across-the-board rejection of the idea that direct conflict 
would be a possibility if Russia were to advance upon one of the Baltic States exposes the deterrence 
problem NATO—the West and more specifically the United States—faces today. NATO expanded 
during the so-called ‘unipolar moment.’ This has led to a dilemma in which the United States’ 
credibility regarding its commitment to its vital interests has been enmeshed with its willingness to 
defend non-vital interests that Russia may care about more that than U.S. does. 
Mearsheimer also comments that “nuclear weapons make conquest more difficult; 
international conflicts revert from tests of capability and will to purer tests of will, won by the side 
willing to run greater risks and pay greater costs.”137 He writes that this gives defenders a greater 
advantage because they are protecting their very existence. However, currently Russia is behaving in 
a revisionist manner. There is a chance that this behavior will escalate into a threat more direct than 
annexations of Ukraine and Georgia, aka non-member states. The current situation seems to be a 
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more or less pure test of will in which Russia is more inclined toward risk-taking than the United 
States. The reason that Russian revisionism has been met with little real opposition seems to be due 
to the fact that, thus far, their actions have not threatened the existence of the United States or its 
vital interests. The United States is thus unwilling to directly confront Russian revisionism. As Putin 
tests the boundary in his search for America’s red line, he continually provokes questions over the 




Chapter 4:  
Stability, Theory, and Impermanency 
 
Wohlforth claims that a unipolar world offers stability. Realists contest this, taking the 
opposite stance that unipolarity leads to increased competition amongst states. Earlier I argued that 
liberal ideology is flawed, and ignores strategy to the extent that the applications of such ideas can 
undermine power structures. In other ways, liberal ideology is as valid as realist thinking. Explicitly 
or not, liberals accept that power is a key aspect of the international system. It is easy to understand 
how arguments such as Asmus’ that pushed for NATO expansion were both grounded in liberal 
thinking and accommodating for the reality of power dynamics. The expansion and maintenance of 
alliances is a liberal proposition that accepts the role power plays in the international system. Both 
schools of thought seek out the same goal of stability. Both schools of thought thus falter on the 
same line - they aim to ‘end’ the international system of power dynamics and geopolitics. Both 
schools fall prey to the dream that the system can be won. Clausewitz’s influence can be seen on 
both schools; for liberals, the primacy of the defense that Clausewitz argued for is a major part of 
their theory. For realists, Clausewitz’s thoughts on means and competition are intimately intertwined 
with their theories. On defeat, Clausewitz writes that “the defeated state often see it in only a 
transitory evil, for which a remedy can yet be found in the political circumstances of a later day.”138  
As I have said before, an enemy defeated is not an enemy destroyed. Total conclusion of 
conflict may be an impossibility in the modern era. The War on Terror demonstrates how true this is 
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when it comes to conflicts with nonstate actors. The slow process of negotiating and dealing with 
other states shows how this is likely the case when it comes to legitimate actors as well. Actions are 
condemned, sanctions are drawn, but proactive response is slow and made hesitantly. For one, the 
threat of escalation that WMD’s present has had an impact on where red lines are drawn. This is the 
more cynical way of viewing Waltz’s nuclear peace theory - the possibility of threats occurring is 
reduced but the possibility of concrete defensive responses as well. Far before the discussion of 
deterrence and nuclear weapons though, there are other aspects of the international system that 
make the total defeat of an enemy difficult in the modern era. From the liberal side, things like 
democratic peace theory, the intertwining of economies, and values such as human rights place 
limits on what can be considered justifiable action. This, again, goes both ways. It means that there is 
to some extent a limit to what a state can do to its citizens or the citizens of other states before it is 
exiled from the international system or confronted by it. At the same time, these realities place limits 
on the defensive actions a state can take - not in the sense of pure ‘defense’ but in the Clausewitzian 
sense of taking a defensive action and thus beginning a war. 
Both sides of the international relations debate discuss stability, but what we talk about when 
we talk about stability comes down to the evolution of what is considered possible and acceptable. 
Regardless of one’s theoretical perspective, one must address these limits. What both schools fail to 
acknowledge in full is that these limits, this drive toward stability, is dual-pronged. Limitations are 
placed on status quo, defensive actors just as they are placed on aggressors. While realists and 
liberals each have their own thoughts on what the outcome of the international system will be, the 
idea pervades on both sides that such an outcome exists. That the path of history will lead to some 
sort of favorable stability. This may very well be true, and when comparing the modern world to the 
history one can see the upward trend of global society. Societies are by and large more stable and 
wealthy than ever before. By practically any metric, the world is better off and more peaceful than it 
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ever has been. Again, realists and liberals have their respective answers for this. Here, though, what 
matters is that stability can be understood as the evolution of limitations societies place on 
themselves and one another. Whether it be power, institutions, ideas, leaders, or any other factor, 
stability is at its core the same as war or states. Its nature is reciprocal.  
Of course, scholars understand that and write on how states interact with and check one 
another. What seems to be lost in translation is the acceptance that this reciprocal evolution lends 
itself better to stagnation than conclusion. The range of acceptable state behavior shrinks. This 
conception of the path of history may be best explained as a sort of diminishing returns graph. As 
we lurch closer toward the finish line realists and liberals believe exists, the probability of our 
finishing the race decreases. Before the Soviet collapse, realists seemed to be the ‘right’ ones. In the 
1990’s, the liberal interpretation seemed likely. In modern day, realist theory again sounds most 
fitting. Yet Vladimir Putin could die tomorrow and Medvedev could have a change of heart, trading 
out Novorossiya for a new Uskoreniie plan. Or China could install democratic reforms. These 
outcomes are unlikely, but the point the future is unknowable. At any given time a particular theory 
will seem correct. In the 1990’s NATO expansion seemed like a fine idea, few were worried about a 
resurgent Russia, many feared its demise.  
The only thing that seems absolutely true is that the side of the international relations debate 
that is right at any given time changes. This, above all else, ought to be kept in mind when policies 
are being implemented and grand strategy is being crafted. Embracing this reality too strongly 
threatens inaction - choices do have to be made - but crafting a grand strategy around what must be 
done rather than what can be done will likely prove to be a more valuable endeavor.  
Liberals and realists conceive of the path of history as a march toward stability. I suggest that 
the further down the path we get the slower the march becomes, due to the reciprocal nature of the 
increased limitations that we refer to as “stability.” As such, it seems foolhardy to accept either 
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theory in full and apply it to policy. It is easy to use hindsight to critique liberalism, just as it was 
convenient to use the end of the Cold War as proof of liberalism’s value. To claim that NATO 
expansion was a mistake simply because of what we know now is a weak argument. For one, that 
claim can be refuted swiftly by any number of ‘what ifs’ or criticisms of policy implementation. The 
problem with NATO expansion was that it was a policy fueled by the belief that a conclusion had 
been reached, but as our world becomes more stable that conclusion is farther and farther out of 
reach. As our ability to destroy enemies in totality is lessened, we should operate under the 
assumption that our actions can always be confronted at a later time. Because of stability we live in a 
world where defeat is more and more consistently a temporary evil. In particular, for a state with a 
defensive military strategy such as the United States, this means that the actions that prompt military 
response against great or nuclear powers must be significant; schisms.  
War is a defensive choice, and in a stable world the list of what justifies this choice is short. 
It is made up of vital interests and realistically nothing else. The reciprocal modification of will is at 
the heart of political contests, be they violent or diplomatic. This is what makes the situation of 
unipolarity and NATO so difficult. The problem is not necessarily the dominance of ideology, nor is 
it even unipolarity itself. The problem is that both liberals and realists seek out policy prescriptions 
that revolve around the assumption that the international system, in being stable, is nearing a 
conclusion and that the dominance of some ‘thing’ will become permanent. For liberals, it is 
ideology. For realists, it is a particular power. This is not to say that the position the United States 
enjoys as the unipolar power is in danger or that it won’t continue to enjoy said position for the 
foreseeable future, but simply that as military conflict amongst state actors becomes less of a 
possibility, the value a state assigns to various political objects remains incredibly important. 
Whether it is through ideology or raw power, a unipolar power is defined by its ability to exert its 
will over the entire international system, not without fail, but without threat. Because a unipolar 
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power does not have to consider the balance of power or security threats in the same way that states 
in more precarious positions must, it has the ability to make its voice heard in many contexts. This is 
a symptom of power.  
When the unipolar power is on the offensive, expanding through alliance making or state-
building, smaller, weaker states often make the calculus that denying the unipole of its ambition is an 
unattractive option. They are, in Clausewitzian terms, deciding to not make that first defensive act of 
war. When the unipole is acting defensively, or content with the status quo, the benefit can fall to 
the state that determines that the unipole will not make that same first defensive move. In the 1990’s 
and early 2000’s, the United States actively pursued expansionist policies. Later on, it slid into more 
status quo-seeking behavior. States could go against the United States’ aims and it would be the 
burden of the United States to stop them. During the 1990’s and early 2000’s, when liberalism 
seemed correct and the spread of liberal ideology was an active agenda item, the United States 
functioned as an offensive-dominant unipolar power. The United States’ list of vital interests 
expanded beyond its closest allies, its homeland, and essential resources. The United States, as the 
unipole in a post-historical world, added liberal democracy to that list. Of course ideology was 
always on said list; that it was is central to the narrative of the Cold War. At the same time, though, 
there was a divide between rhetoric and strategy that tempered the pursuit of this goal.139  
The divide between rhetoric and action faded away during the unipolar moment. Perhaps 
not entirely, but enough so that NATO evolved from an alliance to a community. The organization 
still lists its “core tasks” as being “collective defence [sic]…crisis management…[and] cooperative 
security,”140 but its mission post-fall shifted from explicit counter-balancing to the protection and 
promotion of democracy. In the 2016 Warsaw-Summit guide, the organization specifies that it 
“recommits to NATO enlargement as the best way of achieving ‘our goal of a Europe whole and 
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free, and sharing common values.’”141 NATO enlargement is explicitly intended to spread the West’s 
set of values. In a way this is strategic, it follows the liberal logic that democracies interact with one 
another peacefully so more democracy will mean more peace. At the same time, the organization 
makes it clear that “the Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary,” yet “it provides a 
comprehensive list of capabilities the Alliance aims to maintain and develop to counter existing and 
emerging threats.”142 Russia isn’t an enemy of NATO so long as it isn’t an enemy to democracy. 
However Russia as it exists today is in opposition to the liberal democratic project.  
While NATO isn’t explicitly balanced against Russia, it exists as a community of states with 
shared values dedicated to the spread of democracy and the defense of it. For all intents and 
purposes, its strained relationship with Russia is a defining feature of the organization. As such, 
there will be times when the entities clash. During the 2000’s when NATO was expanding, Russian 
officials condemned and protested the act. It was an ideological mission propelled by a strategic 
mechanism. That strategic mechanism, alliances, is a tool of liberalism and at the time it seemed like 
a valid option. The problem is that there needs to be a reason for members to exist in an alliance. 
Even though that reason was reestablished as the protection of a shared set of values, that alone is 
not enough. Alliances are by nature tools for balancing. Regardless of intent on the West’s part, the 
expansion of an exclusionary alliance up to Russia’s borders would be perceived as balancing against 
Russia. In Russia, it is still perceived and publicized as such. In February of 2017, Putin was quoted 
saying that, “NATO's new mission is the containment of Russia…The alliance was running 
expansionist policies before, but now they have found a different, as they believe, a more serious 
reason for it."143 That quote comes from a story the markedly biased Pravda Report ran, and Putin has 
his own motivations for propagating such a narrative. Still, he is not entirely wrong and whether that 
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is his legitimate interpretation of the NATO-Russia dynamic or not, NATO’s expressed mission is 
somewhat congruent with that interpretation.  
“The Alliance does not consider any country to be its adversary,”144 but there are states that 
by nature or action have an adversarial relationship with the alliance; Russia is one of them. As 
stated before, there must be some justification for a member’s presence in an alliance. Without 
dissolving into the Trump-ian argument that some states get more out of NATO than they put in, it 
should be noted that there are many small Eastern-European member states that rely on the alliance 
for security but are of little strategic consequence to the great Western powers. Nearly two-thirds of 
NATO’s military expenditures are paid for by the United States. While Estonia may be a vital 
interest to Germany, and Germany to the United States, and thus Estonia a secondary interest to the 
United States, its sovereignty and the health of its democracy is ultimately of little strategic 
consequence to the United States. In an age of war fatigue and in the aftermath of a recession, the 
effect of which is still perceived if not still as heavily felt, many of the United States’ citizens fail to 
see the value in paying to protect these states. Clausewitz writes,  
“one and the same political object can in different nations, and even in one and the same 
nation at different times, produce different reactions. We can therefore allow the political 
object to serve as the standard only insofar as we bear in mind its influences on the masses 
which it is to affect. So the character of these masses must be considered.”145  
 
A consideration of the character of the United States’ masses would indicate that, today, the value 
assigned to NATO and its expansion project as political objects has decreased. A large portion of 
the United States’ population seems to fail to see the reason for including NATO’s easternmost 
member states in the alliance. Competition over political objects is a perpetual balancing act, as 
Clausewitz notes. The state with a greater will vis a vis a particular object will fight more voraciously 
for ownership of it. Power dynamics play an important role in this balance; a state may wish to 
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contest the United States’ foreign policy, but if it is powerless to do so its will, no matter how great, 
means little. Power, in the Clausewitzian sense, is a combination of will and means. In different 
ratios this combination of will and means will result in particular outcomes. A state inferior in means 
but superior in will can win a certain contest. And, more relevant to the United States’ unipolar 
situation, the opposite can occur. NATO expansion was carried out during a time when the 
geopolitical game seemed to be over; as already noted, this analysis relied on the faulty assumption 
that the path toward increased stability has an end other than a slowing of pace and a reduction of 
acceptable behaviors.  
Realists and liberals alike based their unipolar theories and policy prescriptions on the belief 
that the utter supremacy of the United States’ power meant that no state could reasonably contest it. 
This belief is grounded in the mistaken conclusion that preponderance of power can subordinate the 
effect of political will’s unpredictable and fickle nature. There is little reason to think that the United 
States will suffer a decline in military power at any point in the near future. However, the will behind 
NATO and the liberal democratic project has diminished over time, in part due to the future of the 
project being peripherally threatened. For some of the United States’ citizens, NATO itself does not 
seem “worth it.” For policymakers, Russia’s revisionist behavior serves as a warning signal that 
further pursuit of expansion may result in conflict. NATO hasn’t added new members since 2009, it 
doesn’t seem likely that it will add any more Eastern European states to its roster any time soon. 
Some states, like Ukraine, that were included in discussions of possible expansion a decade ago are, 
for obvious reasons, no longer. It seems that the NATO expansion project has been put on hold, 
and that the West’s goal now is to preserve the status quo. The issue is that today’s status quo 
spheres of influence are starkly different from those of the 1990’s. The will of the West is no longer 
to pursue expansion, with its responsibility then being the protection its recent acquisitions. Putin 
has not gone so far as to directly call into question the strength or validity of NATO’s security 
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assurances. Nonetheless, allied states are far more nervous about a Russian threat than they were at 
the turn of the millennium.  
The NATO expansion project has stalled, the protection project is underway. This is the 
question of whether or not NATO over-expanded. I would argue that due to the intemperance of 
the unipolar power, - the United States - the alliance did over-expand. As already stated, the belief 
that history could and did end, combined with the evolution of the international system into a 
unipolar one, the United States pursued a grand strategy that failed to properly consider the strategic 
implications of its actions. During the unipolar moment, the spread of liberal democracy became a 
vital interest of the United States. In an absolute strategic sense of course it wasn’t, but it was 
pursued as such in terms of policy. Russia’s revisionist behavior has influenced the West’s behavior, 
and a shift occurred in which expansion slowed and the protection of the status quo became the 
predominant concern. Strategy and geopolitics are once again acknowledged as enduring concerns. 
What makes NATO expansion a particularly interesting case is that the organization itself has been a 
vital interest of the United States since its founding and its renewed mission, as a community with 
shared values, is intimately connected with the vital interest, at least on a rhetorical level, of the 
protection and advancement of democracy. As such, the validity of the United States’ claim that it 
holds these two interests as vital is inseparable from its commitment to NATO’s newest members. 
This is the stranglehold of stability and the reason why NATO expansion contributed to the United 
States’ current predicament.  
Unless a vital interest is threatened, the United States will likely not respond to Russia’s 
revisionist behavior with military force. It may not even do so if a vital interest were threatened. 
Putin’s “salami-slicing”146 undermines the United States’ validity, but there is little that United States 
seems likely to do in direct response to it, since he has yet to actually threaten any state that the 
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United States has a concrete commitment to. The provocation must be great to prompt direct 
response; so long as the actions Putin takes do not breach the United States’ red line, the United 
States’ credibility is vulnerable to being chipped away at. I can’t pretend to know what the United 
States would do if Putin endangered a recent NATO member’s sovereignty or posit that such a 
situation is plausible or even possible. If we take Russia to be a rational, security-seeking actor, 
attacking an ally of the United States that is backed with the security assurance of Article V wouldn’t 
be a possibility. Yet because of his success with revisionism in other, non-protected parts of Eastern 
Europe, that scenario is thought about and discussed often. A Russian invasion of a Baltic state, or, 
more likely, a domestically-spawned coup or rejection of the government announced by a regional 
official with Russian military personnel in the frame - to protect civil order during the transitory 
period - might be met with condemnations and inaction from the United States. That this is an 
outcome seems even possible should be considered is a victory for Putin. 
Just as it’s unclear what the United States would do, it is unclear what the United States should 
do. There is no easy solution to the United States’ problem. Due to the nature of NATO as a vital 
interest in itself and as a connecting association to many of the United States’ vital interests, 
protecting the organization’s legitimacy is essential. It would severely damage the United States’ 
reputation and its relationship with its allies if it pulled out of NATO. Supporting NATO’s 
easternmost members against a Russian attack is an equally unattractive option, but one that seems 
relatively distant from the realm of possibility. Taking the current situation, in which Russia has an 
adversarial relationship to NATO and the West, and has made aggressive steps toward undermining 
the sovereignty of Eastern European states, it is difficult to think of a plan of action that avoids the 
re-ignition of the Cold War. 
I won’t attempt to offer a solution to this problem here, since it would be purely speculative. 
The cause of the problem, the reason why this United States is in this situation, seems to be that 
 61 
scholars and policymakers’ hubris aligned with a point in time when the United States could operate 
without considering strategy. Unipolar powers undermine themselves by expanding beyond their 
vital interests. Doing so would not be a problem if defeated states were permanently defeated, and 
each victory had a final and enduring outcome. Liberals and realists alike take this as either truth or 
possibility, but in the stable modern world the absolute destruction of an enemy is impossible. As 
such, there can never be any guarantee that the consequences of one’s victory will be lasting. 
Crafting a grand strategy with the belief that such a guarantee can exist will create difficulties for the 






Arendt, Hannah. The Portable Hannah Arendt. New York: Penguin Putnam, 2000.  
Art, Robert J., and Kenneth N. Waltz, editors. The Use of Force: International Politics and Foreign Policy.  
Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1971. 
Asmus, Ronald D. Opening NATO’s Door. New York: Columbia UP, 2002. 
Asmus, Ronald D. and Steven Larrabee and Richard Kugler. Building A New NATO. Foreign Affairs,  
September/October 1993. 
Bennett, Kirk. Can NATO Defend the Baltics? The American Interest,  13, July 2016. 
Bertram, Christoph. "Why NATO Must Enlarge." NATO Review, vol. 45, no. 2, Mar. 1997, pp. 14- 
17. 
Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. New York City, Macmillan, 1973. 
Brooks, Stephen G. and William C. Wohlforth. Power, Globalization, and the End of the Cold War:  
Reevaluating a Landmark Case for Ideas. International Security, 2001. 
Brooks, Stephen G., and William C. Wohlforth. "Hard Times for Soft-Balancing." International  
Security, vol. 30, no. 1, Summer 2005, pp. 72-108. 
---. World out of Balance: International Relations and the Challenge of American Primacy. Princeton, 
Princeton UP, 2008. 
Brown, Emma. Ronald D. Asmus, who pushed for NATO expansion, dies at 53. Washington Post. 05,  
March 2011. 
The Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Report to Congress on  
NATO Enlargement. 1997. 
Bush, George W. Remarks Honoring Central European Nations on Their Upcoming Admission to the North  
 63 
Atlantic Treaty Organization. United States Government, 05, August 2003. 
Cable News Network, Senate Ratifies NATO Expansion Treaty, May 8, 2003.  
Clausewitz, Carl Von. Michael Howard, and Peter Paret. On War. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1976.  
Clunan, Anne L. "Historical Aspirations and the Domestic Politics of Russia's Pursuit of  
International Status." Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 7 Oct. 2014. 
Coffey, Luke, and Daniel Kochis. The Baltic States: The United States Must Be Prepared to Fulfill Its  
NATO Treaty Obligations. Heritage Foundation, 29 Sept. 2015. 
Copeland, Dale C. The Origins of Major War. Ithaca, Cornell UP, 2000. 
Croft, Adrian. Obama says NATO needs to boost presence in eastern Europe. Reuters, 26, March 2014.  
Eggleston, Roland, NATO: Russia Doubts New Strategic Concept, Radio Free Europe, February 9, 1999.  
Falkenrath, Richard A. America’s Achilles Heel: Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical  
Terrorism and Covert Attack. Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2001. 
Fukuyama, Francis. "The End of History?" The National Interest, Summer 1989. 
Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security 
Policy during the Cold War Revised and Expanded Edition. New York: Oxford,  2005. 
Gerson, Joseph. Empire and The Bomb. London: Pluto Press, 2007. 
Goldgeier, James M. Not When But Who. NATO Review, 2003. 
Goldgeier, James M. Promises Made, Promises Broken? War on the Rocks, 12, July 2016.  
Haas, Mark L. "Ideological Polarity and Balancing in Great Power Politics." Security Studies, vol. 23,  
2014, pp. 715-53. 
---. "The United States and the End of the Cold War: Reactions to Shifts in Soviet Power, 
Policies, or Domestic Politics?" International Organization, vol. 61, no. 1, Winter 2007, pp. 145-
79. 
Humphrey, Ted. Perpetual Peace, and other Essays on Politics, History, and Morals/ Immanuel Kant;  
 64 
Translated, with Introduction by Ted Humphrey. Indianapolis: Hackett Pub. Co, 1983. 
Huntington, Samuel P. Democracy's Third Wave. Journal of Democracy, 1991. 
Ikenberry, G. John. "Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Persistence of American Postwar  
Order." International Security, vol. 23, no. 3, Winter 1998, pp. 43-78. 
Itzkowitz Shifrinson, Joshua R. "Deal or No Deal? The End of the Cold War and the U.S. Offer to  
Limit NATO Expansion." International Security, vol. 40, no. 4, Spring 2016, pp. 7-44. 
Kagan, Robert. The End of History and the Return of Dreams. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2008. 
Kissinger, Henry. Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy. New York: Harper, 1957. 
Kissinger, Henry. "The Dilution of NATO." The Washington Post, 8 June 1997. 
Kofman, Michael. Fixing NATO Deterrence in the East, or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love  
NATO's Crushing Defeat by Russia. War on the Rocks, 16, May 2016. 
Krauthammer, Charles. "The Unipolar Moment." Foreign Affairs, vol. 70, no. 1, Jan. 1990/1991, pp.  
23-33. 
Krupnik, Charles, editor. Almost NATO: Partners and Players in Central and Eastern European Security.  
Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield, 2003. 
Layne, Christopher. The Peace of Illusions: American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the Present. Ithaca,  
Cornell UP, 2006. 
---. "The Unipolar Illusion Revisited." International Security, vol. 31, no. 2, Fall 2006, pp. 7-41. 
---. "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise." International Security, vol. 17, 
no. 4, Spring 1993, pp. 5-51. 
Levi, Michael. On Nuclear Terrorism. Cambridge: Harvard UP, 2007.  
Lipset, Seymour Martin. The Democratic Century. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004. 
Mandelbaum, Michael. Mission Failure: America and the World in the Post-Cold War Era. New York City,  
Oxford UP, 2016. 
 65 
Mattis, James. McGinley Lecture, The Heritage Foundation, 2015. 
Mcfaul, Michael. "Faulty Powers: Who Started the Ukraine Crisis?" Foreign Affairs, Nov.-Dec. 2014,  
pp. 167-78. 
Mearsheimer, John J. Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War. International Security,   
1990. 
Mearsheimer, John J. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Norton, 2001. 
Monteiro, Nuno P. "Unrest Assured: Why Unipolarity Is Not Peaceful." International Security, vol. 36,  
no. 3, Winter 2011, pp. 9-40. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Press Release NAC-S(99)64. North Atlantic Treaty Organization,  
24, April 1999. 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization,  NATO Warsaw-Summit Guide, 2016. 
Nowlin, David V., and Ronald J. Stupak. War as an Instrument of Policy: Past, Present, and Future.  
Lanham, UP of America, 1998. 
Odom, William E. The Collapse of the Soviet Military. New Haven, Yale UP, 1998. 
Paret, Peter. Clausewitz and the State. Princeton, Princeton UP, 1985. 
Pravda Report, “Putin: NATO Wants Russia to Confront the West,” February 16, 2017. 
Reiter, Dan. Democracies at War. Princeton: Princeton UP, 2002. 
Reiter, Dan. Democracy, Deception, and Entry Into War. Security Studies, 2012. 
Rozanov, Anatoli. Comparative Analysis of Publications on NATO's Transformation and Enlargement in 
Belarusian Independent and Government Press, 1996-1997. NATO Democratic Institutions Individual  
Fellowships Programme, 1997/1999. 
Sestanovich, Stephen. "Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West's Fault: How the West Has Won."  
Foreign Affairs, vol. 93, no. 6, November-December 2014, pp. 171-175.  
Russett, Bruce. Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World. Princeton, Princeton  
 66 
UP, 1993. 
Shlapak, David A. and Michael Johnson. Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO's Eastern Flank: Wargaming the  
Defense of the Baltics. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2016. 
Schelling, Thomas C. Arms and Influence. New Haven, Yale UP, 1966. 
Schuessler, John M. The Deception Dividend: FDR’s Undeclared War. International Security, 2010. 
Schwenninger, Sherle R. "The Case against NATO Enlargement: Clinton's Fateful Gamble." The  
Nation, 20 Oct. 1997. 
Selden, Zachary. "Balancing Against or Balancing With? The Spectrum of Alignment and the  
Endurance of American Hegemony." Security Studies, vol. 22, 2013, pp. 330-64. 
Shimkus, John. H.Con.Res.116 - Recommending the integration of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia  
into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 107th Congress (2001-2002). 
Smith, Hugh. On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas. New York City, Palgrave Macmillan,  
2005. 
Snyder, Jack. Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition. 2nd ed., Ithaca, Cornell UP,  
1993. 
Strassler, Robert B. The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War. New  
York: Free Press, 1996. 
Tang, Shiping. The Security Dilemma: A Conceptual Analysis. Security Studies, 2009. 
Tocqueville, Alexis. Alexis de Tocqueville on Democracy, Revolution, and Society. Chicago: University of  
Chicago Press, 1980. 
Trenin, Dmitri. The Silence of the Bear. NATO Review, 2002. 
Tribune News Service. Minister Accuses Nato Of Planning Further Expansion. Tribune News Service, 08,  
February 1999. 
Tsereteli, Mamuka. 20, July 2015. Georgia Needs A Shorter Path for Membership in NATO, Not a MAP.  
 67 
Atlantic Council. 
United States 104th Congress. 22, February 1995. H.R. 7, National Security Revitalization Act. United  
States Government. 
Tsygankov, Andrei. "Vladimir Putin's Last Stand: The Sources of Russia's Ukraine Policy." Post-Soviet  
Affairs, vol. 31, no. 4, 4 Feb. 2015, pp. 279-303. 
United States Senate, Senate Confirmation Hearing of General James Mattis, 1/12/17. 
Van Evera, Stephen. Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict. Ithaca, Cornell UP, 1999. 
Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987. 
Walt, Stephen M. "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power." International Security, vol. 9,  
no. 4, Spring 1984, pp. 3-43. 
---. "Alliances in a Unipolar World." World Politics, vol. 61, no. 1, Jan. 2009, pp. 86-120. 
---. "The Case for Finite Containment: Analyzing U.S. Grand Strategy." International Security, 
vol. 14, no. 1, Summer 1989, pp. 5-49. 
Waltz, Kenneth N. Foreign Policy and Democratic Politics. Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1967. 
---. Man, the State, and War. 7th ed., New York City, Columbia UP, 1969. 
---. "The Stability of a Bipolar World." Daedalus, vol. 93, no. 3, Summer 1964, pp. 881-909. 
---. "Structural Realism after the Cold War." International Security, vol. 25, no. 1, Summer 2000, 
pp. 5-41. 
---. Theory of International Politics. New York, Random House, 1979. 
Williams, Michael C., and Iver B. Neumann. "From Alliance to Security Community: NATO,  
Russia, and the Power of Identity." Journal of International Studies, vol. 29, no. 2, 2000, pp. 357-
87. 
Wohlforth, William C. "The Stability of a Unipolar World." International Security, vol. 24, no. 1,  
Summer 1999, pp. 5-41. 
 68 
Zevelev, Igor. NATO's Enlargement and Russian Perceptions of Eurasian Political Frontiers. George  
Marshall European Center for Security Studies. 
 
 
